電子圍籬作為拘禁措施與提審案件之審查範圍──評臺灣臺北地方法院111年度行提字第2號與第3號裁定

Abstract

COVID-19 疫情肆虐期間，為避免大規模社區傳播，國家針對感染者與自國外入境者，採取居家隔離與集中檢疫之干預措施，同時輔以電子圍籬監控，藉以確保隔離與檢疫手段之執行。於此種高度干預人身自由之情況下，隔離檢疫者就上開剝奪自由之措施向臺北地方法院聲請提審。然而，本文分析兩號裁定內容發現，法院一方面指摘臺北市衛生局以口頭方式所下命之隔離處分，係具重大明顯瑕疵而自始無效，惟另一方面卻又認定在此條件下，隔離檢疫者之人身自由仍未受到拘束，故難認有逮捕拘禁之事實而予以駁回。對此，法院令人費解之論述，實有割裂適用行政程序法、傳染病防治法與提審法之虞，且違反體系解釋之一致性或融貫性要求，進而破壞法秩序之穩定，喪失法律適用上之可預見性，最終將導致人民無所適從。此外，該裁定亦顯示出人身自由之保護範圍是否涵蓋心理影響、法院審查剝奪自由處分之範圍為何與公共政策之後果考量應在法院審理提審案件中扮演何種角色等三個問題。 針對上述三個問題，本文首先認為，違反電子圍籬規定處以高額罰鍰甚至係刑罰之措施，其將導致隔離檢疫者經濟上與社會評價降級之嚴重不利益，進而對其形成巨大之心理壓制，故應肯認發動電子圍籬措施係屬人身自由之剝奪。其次，法院審查剝奪自由措施之範圍，因無涉罪責認定與尊重行政機關發動剝奪自由措施之專業裁量，故不審查該措施之合目的性，而係應審查其實體理由與踐行程序之合法性，並非如傳統實務見解所稱僅審查程序合法性。最後，居家隔離者聲請提審後，法院審查行政機關之隔離處分，倘發現其具有重大瑕疵原因而自始無效，此時法院無須受限於公共政策之防疫角度，考慮釋放當事人之「後果」並自為限縮裁定釋放之範圍。因此，法院倘認行政機關所命之居隔處分自始無效，即應立即當庭開釋隔離檢疫者，落實憲法第8 條保障人身自由之意旨。

During the COVID-19 pandemic, in order to prevent large-scale community transmission, Taiwan implemented home isolation and centralized quarantine through measures such as electronic fence surveillance for infected individuals and those arriving from overseas. Under such a high level of interference with personal liberty, the quarantined and isolated person applied to the Taipei District Court for review of habeas corpus of the deprivation of liberty measure. However, an analysis of the two rulings reveals that, on the one hand, the court criticized that the isolation ordered orally by the Department of Health, Taipei City Government is obviously flawed and invalid from the beginning, but on the other hand, the Court found that the personal liberty of the quarantined and isolated person had not been restrained under these circumstances, and therefore dismissed the case for lack of arrest and detention. For this, the Court’s incomprehensible reasoning threatens to divide the application of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Communicable Disease Control Act, and the Habeas Corpus Act, and violates the requirement of consistency or coherence in systematic interpretation. Therefore, it will destroy the legal stability and predictability. Ultimately, the people are in a very Catch-22 situation. In addition, the two rulings also brought to light three matters: whether personal liberty protection extends to psychological impacts, the extent to which the court should examine cases involving deprivation of liberty, and the significance of public policy considerations in the court’s evaluation of an arraignment case. In the light of the above three problems, this article points out that the imposition of high fines or even criminal penalties for violating the provisions of electronic fencing will lead to a serious economic and social downgrading of the quarantined and isolated person, which will in turn form a great psychological suppression, and therefore should be recognized as a deprivation of personal liberty. Secondly, the court examines the scope of deprivation of liberty measures. Since there is no culpability determination and respect for the professional discretion of the administrative agency to initiate deprivation of liberty measures, the court does not examine the suitability of the measure, but only examines its substantive reasons and the legitimacy of the procedure. Instead of simply reviewing procedural legality, as traditionally perceived. Finally, after the quarantined and isolated person applies for arraignment, the court examines the administrative agency’s quarantine sanction. In this case, the court is not bound by public policy considerations to consider the “consequences” of releasing the client and limit the scope of the ruling on release from the perspective of the administrative agency’s prevention of disease. Therefore, if the court finds that the segregation ordered by the executive branch is invalid from the beginning, it should immediately release the quarantined and isolated person in court to implement the intent of Article 8 of the Constitution to protect personal freedom.