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dc.contributor.authorChang, Shao-Chuanen_US
dc.contributor.authorLin, Li-Yunen_US
dc.contributor.authorHorng, Ruey-Yunen_US
dc.contributor.authorWang, Yau-Deen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-08T15:36:39Z-
dc.date.available2014-12-08T15:36:39Z-
dc.date.issued2014-06-01en_US
dc.identifier.issn0033-2941en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.2466/31.01.PR0.114k24w8en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/24996-
dc.description.abstractTaiwanese college students (N = 101) participated in the study to examine the effects of the amount of an endowment, the tangibility of an endowment, and the certainty of the recipient on selfishness in a modified dictator game. Results showed that dictators were more selfish when allocating tangible (money) than less tangible (honor credits) endowments. Selfishness was higher when large amounts of money were involved. The certainty of the recipient was manipulated by whether the recipient was chosen and announced before or after the decision. Unexpectedly, participants were more self-interested in the certain-recipient condition than in the uncertain-recipient condition. In the honor condition, the amount of an endowment and the certainty of the recipient did not affect participants\' allocations.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.titleTHE EFFECT OF AMOUNT AND TANGIBILITY OF ENDOWMENT AND CERTAINTY OF RECIPIENTS ON SELFISHNESS IN A MODIFIED DICTATOR GAMEen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.2466/31.01.PR0.114k24w8en_US
dc.identifier.journalPSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTSen_US
dc.citation.volume114en_US
dc.citation.issue3en_US
dc.citation.spage720en_US
dc.citation.epage739en_US
dc.contributor.department交大名義發表zh_TW
dc.contributor.department經營管理研究所zh_TW
dc.contributor.departmentNational Chiao Tung Universityen_US
dc.contributor.departmentInstitute of Business and Managementen_US
dc.identifier.wosnumberWOS:000338721800004-
dc.citation.woscount0-
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