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dc.contributor.authorHwang, MSen_US
dc.contributor.authorLee, CCen_US
dc.contributor.authorHwang, SJen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-08T15:41:48Z-
dc.date.available2014-12-08T15:41:48Z-
dc.date.issued2002-11-01en_US
dc.identifier.issn0169-2968en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/28428-
dc.description.abstractRecently, Hwang and Shi proposed an efficient proxy signature scheme without using one-way hash functions. In their scheme, an original signer needn't send a proxy certificate to a proxy signer through secure channels. However, there are two public key substitution methods that can be used to attack their scheme. In this article, we show that their scheme is vulnerable to the public key substitution attacks.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectcryptographyen_US
dc.subjectdigital signatureen_US
dc.subjectone-way hash functionen_US
dc.subjectproxy signaturesen_US
dc.titleCryptanalysis of the Hwang-Shi proxy signature schemeen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.journalFUNDAMENTA INFORMATICAEen_US
dc.citation.volume53en_US
dc.citation.issue2en_US
dc.citation.spage131en_US
dc.citation.epage134en_US
dc.contributor.department資訊工程學系zh_TW
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Computer Scienceen_US
dc.identifier.wosnumberWOS:000181132000002-
dc.citation.woscount3-
Appears in Collections:Articles