完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | 林麗雲 | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | 王耀德 | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-12-12T01:17:40Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-12-12T01:17:40Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT009531518 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11536/39072 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本研究目的在探討獨裁者賽局中三個可能影響人們決策表現的因素:報酬性質(金錢、點數)、對手期待(有、無)、報酬大小(大、中、小)。實驗中101位參與者被隨機指派到四種不同的實驗情境:2(報酬性質)× 2(對手期待),從事三種報酬大小的報酬分配作業,以參與者分配給對方的比例為依變項的變異數分析結果,參與者在報酬為金錢時分配給對方的報酬(23%)顯著比報酬為點數時(30%)少。對手期待的效果,只有在報酬性質為金錢時出現,當參與者在對手有期待時,分配給對方的金錢(18%)顯著比對手無期待時(28%)少。此外,在報酬大時,獨裁者分配給對手的報酬(24%)也比報酬小時(28%)少。在參與者可以有離開選擇權和自行分配兩種選擇的情況下,在三種不同報酬大小下,選擇離開選擇權的人皆比選擇自行分配多,在報酬性質為金錢下,選擇離開的人數又比報酬性質為點數多。在有選擇離開選擇權選項的情況下,獨裁者在報酬為金錢時分配給自己的報酬(80%)比報酬為點數時(71%)多。但在有選擇離開選擇權時,獨裁者分配給對方的報酬比例並不會因報酬性質,報酬大小,或對手有無期待影響。此研究顯示當報酬為金錢時,人趨向自利,且報酬愈大,自利的程度愈高,甚至不在意自己給別人的印象,或對方的期待。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | The purpose of this study was to investigate the type of payoff, receiver’s expectation, and amount of payoff in dictator game. One hundred and one students were randomly assigned to one of the 2 types of payoff (money vs. credit) X 2 receiver’s expectation of (expecting vs. not expecting) experimental conditions to work on 3 dictator’s game (large, medium, or small payoff). Results of experiment showed that the dictators would be more selfish and allot more money to themselves when payoff was money. The main effect of receiver’s expectation was not significant. But when the payoff was money and the dictator knew the receiver was expecting the money, the dictator in fact distribute even less money to the receiver than when they knew the receiver was not expecting the money. No such effect was found when the payoff was credits. The main effect of the amount of payoff was also significant. The dictator would give the receiver less when the payoff was high, as compared to the low payoff. When the dictators can have an option to take a less amount of payoff and exit without receiver’s knowledge, the decision to exit was affected by the amount of payoffs only. Namely, when there is large amount of payoff, the dictator would be more inclined to take a lesser amount of money and leaving the other party nothing, and in total ignorance of the game. The findings of this study differ from previous studies in many major ways which implies that cultural differences may be in play in reward distribution behaviors. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | zh_TW | en_US |
dc.subject | 獨裁者賽局 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | 決策 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | 報酬 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | 對手期待 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | 離開選擇權 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | dictator game | en_US |
dc.subject | reward distribution decision | en_US |
dc.subject | expectation of receiver | en_US |
dc.subject | exit option | en_US |
dc.title | 報酬性質、對手期待及報酬大小對獨裁者賽局中獨裁者決策的影響 | zh_TW |
dc.title | The Effects of Type and Amount of Payoff, and Receiver’s expectation on Dictator Game | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | 管理科學系所 | zh_TW |
顯示於類別: | 畢業論文 |