完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | 林以文 | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Yi-Wen Lin | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | 鍾惠民 | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | 許和鈞 | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Huimin Chung | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Her-Jiun Shen | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-12-12T01:18:28Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-12-12T01:18:28Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT009539508 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11536/39353 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 本文首先估計1990年到2006年美國上市公司宣告破產後對於其他同產業間未破產的存活公司股價之影響,依據每一破產事件逐筆分別形成equal-weighted及value-weighted的portfolio,再利用所形成的portflio計算研究期間破產宣告事件造成的異常報酬,結果顯示在1990至2000間存活公司呈現顯著負報酬,顯示傳染效果主導了整個破產宣告效果;但是2001至2003為一轉折期,傳染效果及競爭效果皆不顯著,直至2004之後轉變為顯著正報酬,呈現競爭效果主導的狀況。第二部份是探討公司治理與破產宣告效果的關聯。關於公司治理的議題已經廣泛被討論,而有部分論文指出公司治理較差的公司股價較脆弱,較容易受到市場的影響,尤其是負向事件發生時,公司治理差的公司會較好的公司有更大的負向股價波動。因此本文想知道是否公司治理差的公司,若傳染效果影響主導而產生負報酬時,是否公司治理較好的公司負向報酬會較公司治理差的公司為小;而相對的,當競爭效果主導時,是否公司治理較好的公司正報酬會較公司治理差的公司為大。實證結果顯示,公司治理較差的公司在同業其他公司宣告破產時,雖然不顯著,但公司治理指標與異常報酬間的確存在負向關係,也就是公司治理較好的公司在同業間有破產事件發生時,將較公司治理較差的公司呈現較高的異常報酬。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the value and equal weighted SIC-code based surviving firms’ portfolios around the bankruptcy announcement date during 1990 to 2006. The significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns show that contagion effect dominates during 1990 to 2000, while 2001-2003 is a transition period when neither contagion nor competitive effect dominates. Finally, the significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns display competitive effect dominates during 2004 to 2006. Moreover, I examine whether corporate governance mechanisms, especially the market for corporate control, affect the stock price performance when a firm in the same industry announce for bankruptcy. Consistent with the hypothesis, though not significant, the regression analysis shows negative relation between GIM index and the 11-day cumulative abnormal returns, which means that firms of managers protected by more anti-takeover provisions deed face significantly lower cumulative abnormal returns while competing firms bankrupt. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.subject | 公司治理 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | 併購條款 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | 破產宣告效果 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | 傳染效果 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | 競爭效果 | zh_TW |
dc.subject | corporate governance | en_US |
dc.subject | takeover provisions | en_US |
dc.subject | bankruptcy announcement effect | en_US |
dc.subject | contagion effect | en_US |
dc.subject | competitive effect | en_US |
dc.title | 公司治理與競爭者公司破產宣告效果 | zh_TW |
dc.title | Does Firms with Poor Corporate Governance Become More Vulnerable When Competing Firms Bankrupt? | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
dc.contributor.department | 財務金融研究所 | zh_TW |
顯示於類別: | 畢業論文 |