標題: | 代理理論實證研究-以Aloha客運公司為例 An Empirical Study of Agency Theory:A Case study of Aloha Transportation Company |
作者: | 陳瑞鈴 Rei-lin Chen 楊千 Chyan Yang 高階主管管理碩士學程 |
關鍵字: | 代理理論;代理人;委託人;阿羅哈客運公司;VDO資訊系統;Agent theory;Principal;Agent;Aloha passenger transportation company;VDO system |
公開日期: | 2007 |
摘要: | 乘車安全性是顧客搭乘交通工具時的主要考量,而提供乘車安全性的客運公司又需委託駕駛員本身的自律性來保證此服務品質,當客運公司將乘客的安全保障委託給駕駛員執行,此時客運公司與駕駛員之間的關係可以視為代理理論中的「委託-代理」關係,其中客運公司是委託人而駕駛員是代理人,而且客運公司藉由契約來約束駕駛員的安全性駕駛。由於駕駛員契約中主要是以「行車趟數」計酬,故駕駛員在私利及有限理性之下是以快速行車以獲得高酬勞為目的,而客運公司的立場為追求乘客安全以獲得乘客信賴與選擇,進而提升競爭優勢與營業利潤為目標,當委託人與代理人的目標發生衝突且委託人無法証明代理人是否有營私的行為時客運公司和駕駛員二者在代理關係中將產生的問題;因此本研究欲探討如果當委託人有充分資訊可以證明代理人的行為時,則代理人是否較可能會是為了委託人的利益而為?
本研究以阿羅哈客運公司為研究個案公司,該公司於民國93年引進VDO資訊系統的監控制度安裝測試並於民國94年開始執行,依據研究目的,研究中將探討個案公司在執行VDO資訊系統的監控制度之後,也就是說當公司有充分資訊可以證明駕駛員的行為時,則駕駛員是否較可能會是為了公司的利益而為,即公司在乘客安全方面的競爭優勢是否提升,研究過程中將從針對阿羅哈客運公司本身在監控制度執行前後之比較,以及阿羅哈客運公司與其他競爭對手的比較兩方面分析討論,並且選用三個不同來源的資料進行實證分析,其資料來源包括阿羅哈客運公司內部的實際記錄資料、公路警察局的汽車運輸業重大災害緊急交通事故統計資料、以及問卷調查所得的乘客滿意度相關資料等,研究資料的多元性是本文的貢獻之一;此外,跨時間的縱斷面資料分析是本文的貢獻之二。
資料分析結果顯示:阿羅哈客運公司本身在監控制度執行後肇事率大幅度的降低;與其他競爭對手的比較,阿羅哈客運公司在重大災害緊急交通事故統計資料中的肇事次數、死亡人數、以及受傷人數皆屬最低記錄,而且在保證安全功能性與搭乘的滿意度兩構面皆或獲得顧客最高的評價,此結果說明駕駛員因為了解公司執行VDO的監控制度之後可以同步掌他們的駕駛狀況以及能夠明確記載他們的行車記錄,藉以依據執行阿羅哈公司與駕駛員之間所建立的契約,故駕駛員也了解他們不能欺瞞委託人,因而抑制了代理人投機行為的發生,例如:超速、超車等違規行為,此點與Eisenhardt(1989)在實証主義的代理理論中所提的主張:「當委託人有資訊可以證明代理人的行為時,則代理人較可能會是為了委託人的利益而為」相符合;委託人-阿羅哈客運公司也因此提高乘車安全性保證,同時提升該客運公司的競爭優勢。 Safety is a major considering factor of passengers taking a transportation vehicle. For a passenger transportation company, to ensure passengers' safety is done by entrust the drivers. From the agency theory perspective, the company-driver relationship can be viewed as principal-agent where the company is the principal and the drivers are agents. The principal-agent relationship is binded by employment contract in so doing to ensure driving safety. Normally, the payment to the drivers mainly is based on the driving mileages that might easily lead to fast driving to accomplish the task assuming the drivers are economic men. However, the company would put its first priority in safety driving for earning the customers' trust and preference in advancing its competitive advantage and operating profits. Consequently, there must be a conflict between principal and agent in seeking their goals. Therefore, this research is to investigate whether if when principal has sufficient information about the execution of agent's behavior the agent would behave accordingly for the benefit of principal. This research uses Aloha passenger transportation company as a case study. Aloha tested the VDO information monitoring system in the year of 2004 and deployed the system in 2005. This research is to find out whether the deployment of VDO system, i.e., when the principal holds sufficient information to ensure the agent's behavior of doing contra deeds, the drivers would help the company achieving the company's goal or the company's competitiveness is improved. By the comparison of driving records of before and after the installation of monitoring system, and the comparison of Aloha and its competitors' driving records this research would provide a relatively objective observation and analysis. Three sources of data are used for empirical analysis: the internal driving records of Aloha, major emergency and accident statistics from highway police bureau, and the customer satisfaction survey are used for this empirical research. The multiplicity of the research data is one of the major contributions of this research whereas a longitudinal data analysis is the other contribution. Through the analysis this research confirmed that the accident rate of the company indeed is reduced after the installation of VDO system. When compared with competitors, Aloha enjoyed lower emergency and accident counts from the traffic authority. Moreover, Aloha is ranked the highest in the ability to ensure the passengers safety and customer satisfaction. This result demonstrated that when the drivers (the agents) know that the company (the principal) holds the driving records which reduces the asymmetry of information, the drivers will try their best to comply the contra behavior. This observation confirmed the point raised by Eisenhardt (1989, p. 60): " When the principal has information to verify agent behavior, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal." The principal (Aloha) ensures its safety to passengers and advances its competitive advantages. |
URI: | http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT009561532 http://hdl.handle.net/11536/39752 |
顯示於類別: | 畢業論文 |