臺灣光電產業之財務風險指標、股權結構與Tobin's Q關係之研究

Abstract

本研究係探討臺灣光電產業經營績效、公司治理與市場評價之關聯性，以上市、櫃光電公司為樣本，計有111家公司，有效樣本數為667筆，並以我國引進公司治理制度後之2003年至2011年為研究期間。 本研究以Tobin’s Q值為反應企業價值的代理變數，並透過綜合性的財務風險指標Z-score、MZ-score及ZFC來衡量公司經營績效，而公司治理方面則以股權結構為代理變數，將股權結構分為二大面向內部人與機構法人，並再細分為董監事、經理人、大股東、外資、投信及自營商等六個持股比率變數加以探討。 研究結果發現，(一)經營績效方面：公司發生財務危機可能性愈低，財務體質愈健全，Tobin’s Q值愈高，市場評價愈好；(二)公司治理方面：董監事持股比率愈高，Tobin’s Q值愈高，符合Jensen與Meckling(1976)提出之「利益收斂假說」，而經理人持股比率與Tobin’s Q值呈負相關，符合Jensen與Ruback(1983)提出「利益掠奪假說」，大股東持股比率與Tobin’s Q值並無顯著關係；在機構法人持股方面，外資持股比率及投信持股比率與Tobin’s Q值顯著正相關，符合Pound (1988)「效率監督假說」，自營商持股比率與Tobin’s Q值則為負向關係。

The essay aims to find the correlation between the operation performance, corporate governance and the market valuation in opto-electronic industry in Taiwan. The dataset employed in this paper is acquired from 111 companies, including listed and OTC companies. The number of observations is 667 and the period under analysis starts from year 2003 to 2011, after the remarkable introduction of corporate governance system in Taiwan.

The study takes Tobin’s Q value as a proxy variable to reflect the enterprise value. While a comprehensive group of financial risk indicators, Z-score, MZ-score and ZFC, are used to evaluate the operation performance of a company, the ownership structure is a proxy variable to account for the corporate governance. More specifically, the structure of shareholdings is divided into institutional investor and insider and further investigated with six variables, including board directors, managers, major shareholders, QFII, SITE and proprietary dealers.

The conclusions are drawn as follows. (A) Operation performance: The more sound financial status, the less possibility of financial distress; a higher Tobin’s Q value is corresponding to higher market valuation. (B) Corporate governance: a higher Tobin’s Q value is corresponding to higher holding ratio of board directors, in line with the “Convergence of interest hypothesis” proposed by Jensen Meckling(1976); a negative correlation between the holding ratio of the manager and the Tobin’s Q value is found, consistent with “Conflict of interest hypothesis” presented by Jensen Ruback(1983); the relationship between the holding ratio of major shareholders and Tobin’s Q value is not significant. In regard to institutional investor, there is a positive and significant relationship between Tobin’s Q value and holding ratio of QFII and SITE respectively, consistent with Pound’s “Efficiency monitor hypothesis”(1988); the holding ratio of proprietary dealer is negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q value.