臺灣觀光產業及百貨貿易產業之財務風險指標、股權結構與Tobin's Q關係之研究

Abstract

本研究以臺灣觀光產業與百貨貿易產業為對象，探討其財務風險、公司治理與市場評價之關聯性，以上市、櫃公司為樣本計有24家公司，有效樣本數為185筆，並以我國引進公司治理制度後之2003年 至2011年為研究期間。 本研究以Tobin’s Q值為市場評價的代理變數，透過綜合性的財務風險指標Z-score、MZ-score及ZFC來衡量公司財務風險，公司治理方面則以股權結構為代理變數，將股權結構分為內部人與機構法人二大面向，再細分為董監事、經理人、大股東、外資、投信及自營商等六個持股比率變數加以探討。 研究結果發現： 1. 市場評價部份：公司發生財務危機可能性愈低，財務體質愈健全，Tobin’s Q值愈高，市場評價愈好。 2. 公司治理部份： 董監事持股比率與市場評價無顯著之相關性；經理人持股比率與Tobin’s Q值呈負相關，符合Jensen and Ruback(1983)提出之「利益掠奪假說」，大股東持股比率與市場評價呈現負相關，符合Morck et al. (1988)之研究結果。機構法人持股部份，投信持股比率與Tobin’s Q值顯著正相關，符合Pound (1988)「效率監督假說」；外資持股比率與Q為正相關，但並不顯著；自營商持股比率與Tobin’s Q值無顯著相關性。

The research focus on the performance regarding the tourism industry and department store trade industry in Taiwan, corporate governance and market evaluation. in pickup the listed and over counter company samples,as total of 24 companies, valid 185 samples, providing the period from 2003 to 2011, as the remarkable introduction for corporate governance system. This study takes Tobin's Q as proxy variable value in judgment of enterprise value. Also through a comprehensive financial risk benchmark as Z-score、MZ-score and ZFC to evaluate the company operation performance; while the corporate governance considers shareholding structure as a proxy variable, which is divided into two large respects on six shareholding variables as board directors, managers, major shareholders, QFII, SITE and own account dealers. From this study we can conclude the following judgments as (A) market value: The more sound financial status, the lower possibility of company financial crisis; higher Tobin's Q value is corresponding to higher market valuation; ( B ) Corporate governance: the relationship between company manager shareholding ratio and Tobin's Q value is negative correlated, consistent with Jensen and Ruback(1983) Presented " conflict of interest hypothesis "; the relationship with board directors and major shareholder holding ratio to Tobin's Q values is not significant correlated. As regarding to institutional shareholder, there was positive and significant relationship between QFII shareholding and SITE shareholding, consistent with Pound (1988) Efficiency monitor hypothesis; as for own account dealer share-holding ratio is not significant correlated.