上游獨佔下之外部授權者的最適授權策略

Abstract

本論文探討加入上游獨占廠商後，對外部授權者授權策略的影響。我們建立一個模型，其中包含了單一外部授權者、提供中間財的獨占上游廠商以及兩個進行數量競爭的下游廠商。隨後我們比較外部授權者透過單位權利金和固定權利金所獲得的利潤，結果我們發現不論是在非劇烈創新和激烈創新下，單位權利金是外部授權者的最適策略。這與Kamien和Tauman (1986)在無上游供應商模型下所提出的論點不同，他們推論固定權利金才是外部授權者的最佳策略。除此之外，透過單位權利金可以影響上游廠商對中間財的定價以及削弱上游廠商的議價能力。

This thesis examines the impact of incorporating an upstream supplier to the outsider patentee’s licensing decision. The basic model includes an outsider patent holder, an upstream supplier providing the intermediate good, and two downstream firms competing in quantity. The outsider patentee can receive profits by means of either fixed fee licensing or royalty licensing. The optimal licensing for the outsider patentee is royalties in both drastic and non-drastic innovation cases. This result compares to Kamien and Tauman (1986) in which without an upstream supplier a fixed fee is always the optimal licensing strategy for an outsider patentee. Besides, the royalty licensing can affectively affect the price setting on the intermediate good, which weakening bargaining power of the upstream supplier.