公司內部治理機制與主併者之報酬：以新興市場為例

Abstract

本篇文章使用了從2000年1月1號開始，至2008年12月31日為止，共118個由台灣上市或上櫃公司做為主併者的併購樣本。並使用事件研究法之市場模型計算其宣告日前兩天至後天兩的累積超額報酬。之後再使用複迴歸模型檢驗公司內部治理機制對於宣告併購事件時的累積超額報酬是否有顯著的解釋能力。透過研究可以發現，某些公司內部治理機制以及主併者的特質對於累積超額報酬的確有顯著的解釋能力。大股東持股比率、公司規模以及Tobin’s Q對於累積超額報酬有正向且顯著的影響能力。另一方面，公司的槓桿比率、外資持股比率以及宣告前的股價超額報酬則與宣告時的累積超額報酬有著顯著負相關的關係。

In this article, I use 118 acquisition events completed by firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) or the GreTai Securities Market (GTSM) from Jan 1, 2000 to Dec. 31, 2008 as my samples and I use the market model of event study to count the cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date. Then multiple regression models are used to examine if internal corporate governance (CG) mechanisms have effects on acquisition CAR. Through the research I find that some internal CG mechanisms and bidder characteristics have significant effects on the acquisition CAR. Blockholders holding rate, firm size, and Tobin’s Q have positive effects on acquisition CAR. On the other hand, firms with lower foreign investors holding rate, leverage, and stock price runup have higher announcement returns.