大股東與公司政策之關聯性

Abstract

本研究主係以大股東標的公司追蹤資料(panel data)進行分析，並截取大股東個別效果檢定大股東異質性。研究資料係追蹤所有台灣地區公開發行公司大股東，研究結果證實在投資政策、財務政策及治理政策上的大股東個別效果均達統計顯著。投資人偏好之研究上，發現「投資政策派」股東與標的公司之資本支出及研發投入政策有緊密的關聯性；「自由現金流量假說派」股東致力於降低標的公司的現金部位，高度槓桿及低度現金部位政策是其努力重點；「換人派」股東之標的公司更換總經理及董事長與他們有正向顯著的關聯性。最後研究大股東、公司績效與政策間關聯性，發現「投資政策派」股東與績效政策有顯著之正向關聯。此外，本研究試圖研究大股東與公司政策之因果關係後歸納出大股東類別為企業、家族或外資較傾向於「影響」公司政策；政府類別之大股東較傾向於「選擇」標的公司。

This paper investigates the effect of heterogeneity across large shareholders by constructing a blockholder-firm panel data set which tracks all unique blockholders in publicly traded corporations in Taiwan. The results show statistically significant blockholder fixed effects in investment, financing and corporate governance policies. Our study of investor preference indicates that blockholder investment style is closely related to capital expenditure and R&D policy: blockholders of aggressive financial style are systematically related to firms with high debt, high dividend and low free cash; blockholders that replace management are associated with firms replacing the board of directors. Further investigation of the relationship among blockholders, firm performance and firm policies show that aggressive investment style is significantly related to performance. Our analysis of the cause behind large shareholder heterogeneity finds that company, family, and foreign blockholders tend to “influence” policies, while governmental blockholders tend to “select” target firms.