資訊系統委外委託企業和委外軟體服務公司策略選擇之賽局分析

Abstract

資訊系統委外已經成為企業間經常使用的策略之一，無論政府機關或私人企業，委外的原因縱有不同，但是最主要的目的在於追求成功，但在許多的報告均指出，委外的結果有的時候並不是企業所預期的，例如：委外服務的業務雖然是正在成長，但對於委外服務的滿意度卻不是成正比；委外服務供應商有達到服務等級的協定，但卻沒能達成企業主的業務需求；長遠來看，如果沒有做好控管的話，委外服務有可能無法幫企業主真正節省成本。 本論文著重應用賽局分析在委託企業對於是否自行監督委外駐廠軟體人員專案的進度策略，來看監督與否的策略下，效益是否會如委託企業的預期。另委外服務軟體廠商會對於委託企業的策略選擇，所產生的最適反應—遵守或是違背合約。企業資訊委外目的，在於追求成功，所以我們必須要了解影響雙方策略選擇的因素，預先了解雙方的策略反映，避免資訊委外的失敗，本研究以委託企業和委外服務軟體公司的相互關係來建立策略互動分析模式，並於最後提出研究結論與建議，以期能提供委外雙方參考，增進雙方對彼此的瞭解，進而創造雙贏之局面。

Information System Outsourcing (ISO) has become one of the most useful strategies for enterprises. In order to chase the enormous profit in a short period, no matter public governments or private enterprises coincidentally select ISO as their major strategy. However, the result doesn’t achieve a satisfied agreement between enterprises and its associated outsourcing agencies according to recent reports. Although the sales grow as a positive proportion, the satisfaction of service level doesn’t reach the same outcome. On the contrary, service level may be suitable for enterprise; however, the enterprises’ sale expectation could not be achieved. In conclusion, from a long term aspect, ISO may not gain much profit as enterprises expect if the quality and quantity controls are not able to be implemented comprehensively. This study utilizes a game theoretic model to predict the strategic behaviors of different associated outsourcing agencies. In addition, this study uses a self-supervision method to control the scheduled progress of associated agencies. The strategy for the associated outsourcing agencies is to obey or to violate the contract. In order to establish a win-win outcome, understanding interaction factors could prevent a future failure from selecting inappropriate strategies. This study builds a feasible interactive model to analyze, predict and help both enterprises and a software outsourcing vendor to build a better relationship and to gain the optimal profit for each other.