公司治理與股利政策對現金增資公司的長期績效影響

Abstract

學者已證實現金增資公司會有長達三年以上的負報酬現象，而股利增加(減少)也會使得長期報酬有正向(負向)反應。隨著公司治理議題越趨重要，本研究加入公司治理元素，結合代理問題和資訊不對稱情況下，我們關心在現金增資下，是否公司治理較佳之公司會傾向分發股利並有較好的長期績效。本研究以1992到2004年間之現金增資(SEO)公司為樣本，並利用是否發放股利和公司治理好壞做分類，進行長期股價異常績效探討。 研究結果發現，有股利分發公司比無股利分發公司有較優異的長期異常報酬，而公司治理機制較佳的公司比公司治理機制較差的公司有較優異的長期異常報酬。另外，在La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny（2000）的產出假說(outcome hypothesis)前提下，發現現金增資後公司治理機制較差且無股利分發公司，無論是使用買入持有法或是三因子模型，兩年內都必有顯著之負報酬；相較於公司治理機制較佳且有股利分發公司，不但有較少之負報酬，甚至有顯著為正之長期異常報酬。

Many scholars indicate that firms after SEO announcement would sustain long term negative performance for more than three years. However, if firms increase (decrease) its’ dividend payout would result in positive (negative) return in the long run. Recently, the topic of corporate governance is more and more important; we add the element of corporate governance, combine the agency problems and asymmetric problems, and we concern whether would firms with better corporate governance mechanism tend to pay dividends and have better long-term performance after SEO announcement. Categorizing by dividend policy and corporate governance, this paper utilize SEO firms from 1992 to 2004 as samples, and examines the long run performance. We find the dividend-paying firms perform better than the non-dividend-paying firms. And the better corporate governance mechanism firms perform better than the poor corporate governance mechanism firms. Besides, under the outcome hypothesis of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000), we find the long term performance of SEOs firms with poor corporate governance mechanism and zero dividend yield must exist significant negative return for two years, no matter calculated by buy and hold abnormal returns or Fama-French three-factor model. Compared with the better corporate governance mechanism and dividend-paying firms, there exist less negative return, even exist some significant positive return.