美國專利授權合理權利金的計算方式探討

Abstract

近年來，美國專利訴訟的損害賠償金的計算方式以合理權利金為主流，而且其比例有逐漸上升的趨勢。而美國聯邦法院在處理合理權利金的計算標準時，一般都會採用Georgia-Pacific這個著名案例中的假設性協商法來決定合理權利金的比率。本文藉著研究參考Georgia-Pacific案的美國聯邦地區法院及巡迴上述法院的判決，透過實證分析的方法，歸納出Georgia-Pacific案所列舉的十五項因素與合理權利金的關係，並探討這些因素所參考的事實及因素間的相關性，最後探討了Georgia-Pacific案所列舉的十五項因素與判決出來的合理權利金的相關性。經過本文的探討後發現，美國聯邦法院體系所給的合理權利金比率往往高於當事人雙方協商所得的合理權利金，此外，因為台灣廠商的產品大多集中在所謂的IT及3C產品，這些產品因為功能眾多，需要取得的專利眾多，而且專利權人分散，故需要的支付的總權利金往往遠高於單一訴訟的權利金，導致這些產品在美國市場會面臨很大的訴訟風險。因此，本文再透過經濟分析與納許談判理論的方式，去探討合理權利金的比率。藉由這些探討，本文希望於未來建構合理權利金的計算方式時，能提供一個合理且符合邏輯的方案。

After 2000, reasonable royalty has become the major method to calculate the damage of patent infringement lin the United States. In most cases, the US federal courts use hypothetic negotiation to decide the rate of the reasonable royalty in the patent litigation. While using hypothetic negotiation, the courts apply 15 factor listed in the Geogia-Pacific case. Such factors are too many to estimate the legal risk for the both parties in patent litigation, especially for the defendants or potential licensees of issued patents. This article intends to summarize from the cases deciding the rate of reasonable royalty in the federal district courts and Court of Appeal in Federal Circuits (CAFC)in the United States. This study has collected the U.S. federal and CAFC cases with regard to Geogia-Pacific after 1995. Having reviewed those selected cases, t the positive or negative effects of each factor in such patent infringement and the rate of reasonable royalty are found and discussed.