標題: 論罰款機制設計嚇阻廠商囤積惜售行為之法律經濟分析
The Law and Economics Analysis of the Penalty Mechanism Design against Hoarding and Price Gouging for Firms
作者: 劉韋廷
Liu, Wei-Ting
楊千
Yang, Chyan
經營管理研究所
關鍵字: 囤積惜售;罰金;機制設計;逐步賽局;法律經濟分析;Hoarding and Price Gouging;Penalty;Mechanism Design;Sequential Game;Law and Economics Analysis
公開日期: 2010
摘要: 綜觀歷史以來,每逢重大天災及疫情的緊急狀況時,總會在市場上出現瘋狂搶購物資及民生用品等供需失衡的現象。此時,我們常可觀察到不肖業者因存貨投機性動機的因素趁機囤積物資及哄抬價格,導致市場失衡態勢加劇,社會動盪難以帄息。這樣的囤積惜售行為不只削減市場上的經濟效率,更嚴重違反社會公帄,在公帄交易法第24條規定,相關事業囤積惜售或哄抬價格之行為,亦構成足以影響交易秩序之欺罔或顯失公帄之違法行為。 因此在非常時期下,市場的穩定顯得相當重要,此刻政府機關管制將扮演相當重要的角色,本文在文獻探討上先以經濟觀點探討廠商囤積惜售及哄抬價格之原因,並了解各國法制下對於市場異常時期之經濟管制措施,並提出以罰金嚇阻之建議,討論如何利用罰金機制的設計達到嚇阻廠商囤積惜售之目的。 本論文以逐步賽局均衡作為架構,參賽者有二,領導者為政府部門,以極小化社會成本(極小化社會無謂損失)為目標,而追隨者為廠商,以減少產量來提高價格的方式極大化自身利潤(生產者剩餘)為目標。本研究設計三種特定的罰金機制,討論在不同之罰金機制下廠商及政府競爭機關之間的策略均衡,以均衡解探討何種罰金機制對社會較有有幫助。並且經由數值觀察,分別討論出對不正當囤積惜售行為不同的罰金制定模型所產生的影響。最後,討論在決定探討每種罰金架構下對雙方均衡及社會整體利益之影響,並說明符合極小化無謂損失的社會期待下應考慮罰金架構及罰金倍率等因素。
Looking back at history, since disasters and emergencies happened, it’s common to observe imbalance situation between supply and demand that is mad rush to buy goods. At this time, we often observe unscrupulous firms in views of speculative motive to hoard goods and gouge price. It leads to increase market imbalance situation. In the Taiwan Fair Trade Law article 24, firms that hoard goods or gouge price constitute illegal behaviors sufficiently to affect trading order and fall out of fair. Therefore, in extraordinary times, the stability of the market and role of government agencies appeared to be quite important. In the literature, this study would focus on economic views to discuss reasons of hoarding and price gouging. We tend to understand economics legal system in extraordinary times. Then, we would make proposes of penalty deterring, to discuss how the design of penalty mechanisms to deter hoarding firms. The framework of this study is Sequential Game equilibrium. There are two players: Leader is government agency that target to Minimize social dead weight loss cost. Follower is illegal firm that target to Maximize producer surplus by hoarding and price gouging. There are three specific penalty mechanism designs in this study. We would discuss strategy equilibriums between government agency and firm in different penalty mechanism designs. We discuss that one of penalty mechanism designs will lead to better society. By value analysis, we discuss effect of equilibrium and social total benefits of hoarding and price gouging by different penalty mechanism designs. At last, we would illustrate that government agency should consider framework of penalty mechanism and penalty Percentage to reach Minimizing social dead weight loss cost.
URI: http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT079837545
http://hdl.handle.net/11536/48043
顯示於類別:畢業論文