產業競爭度、代理問題與公司績效：以美國、英國、德國與法國為研究樣本

Abstract

產業競爭度與公司績效的關係在過去的文獻並沒有獲得一致的結論。在極大化股東財富的目標下，代理問題在財務文獻上一直被視為是一項重要的影響因子。有鑑於此，本研究考量代理問題的條件下，檢視產業競爭度與公司績效的關係。同時文獻上也指出國家公司治理程度的不同對公司績效的影響也有所不同，因此本研究選擇四大經濟市場--美國、英國、德國與法國，分別檢視在不同程度的代理問題下，產業競爭度與公司績效的關係是否有所不同。結果發現當企業擁有較多自由現金流量，也就是代理問題愈大的情況下，產業競爭度與公司績效呈現相對顯著的正向關係，同時也發現此結果也不因國家公司治理程度不同而有所改變。

Studies on the relationship between industry competition and firm performance have yet to attain a unanimous conclusion. On the goal of maximizing shareholders’ wealth, the financial literature determines agency problem as an important factor affecting firms. Accordingly, the present study investigates the relationship between industry competition and firm performance in relation to agency problem conditions. At the same time, the literature also stated that the different levels of national corporate governance have different impacts on corporate performance. To confirm this finding, our study focuses on the top four economic markets, including the US, the UK, Germany, and France. We also investigate whether or not the relation between industry competition and firm performance would be different under the different levels of agency problem. Our empirical results show that the positive relation between industry competition and firm performance is relatively significant for firms with higher free cash flows that represent severe agency problems. The results do not change under different levels of national corporate governance.