監察人召集股東會衍生問題之探討--以某飲品上市公司為例

Abstract

股東會是落實「股東行動主義」及「股東民主」以及強化「公司治理」最重要的一環，股東會是公司之法定必備最高意思機關，股東會可以聽取報告、承認財務報表、決定重要議案及選舉或解任董事、監察人，是以，有權召集股東會者益顯責任重大，更應謹慎行事，有權召集股東會者，如能適切扮演好啟動股東會議之靈魂人物，將有助於有效發揮股東會之監督功能、使股東權正常行使以維護股東之權益及有助於公司正常之營運。 公司經營權大戰除了比股票、鈔票之外，還要比「法」力，本文乃以民國99年黑松公司股東會之案例，探討監察人在董事會已為合法召集股東會後，仍依公司法第220條之授權，行使監察人之召集權，再為召集股東臨時會，目標公司雙方卻又於股東臨時會前一天開記者會和解收場，以致於以監察人召集之股東臨時會議案全數擱置未決。股東會以董事會召集為常態，其他特殊情形之召集為補充之授權條款，本文係將重心置於公司法第220條以監察人召集股東會之探討，透過對目標公司之事件發生及發展，研究、了解與歸納，希望發現問題之癥結所在。 另，我國民國95年證券交易法引進獨立董事組成審計委員會取代監察人，並由審計委員會行使監察人權限，試圖解決我國監察人監控不彰之困境，然而，有關監察人得單獨召集股東會之權限，依證券交易法第14條之4第4項準用公司法第220條之規定，得由審計委員會成員之獨立董事單獨行使之，惟審計委員會是為合議制，以會議型態形成多數決以杜絕監察人單獨行使之盲點及專業性不足之困窘，甚或避免監察人為一己之私而濫權之制衡機構，目的是希望藉由討論集思廣益以達最適之共識決，若股東會之召集權仍得由審計委員會成員之獨立董事單獨行之，勢必無法擺脫監察人不能發揮應有之監督功能之流弊。 因此，本文於探討目標公司以監察人召集股會所衍生的問題癥結為，現行制度下之監察人因選舉制度及以家族企業居多的國情下，其與董事會之關係密切且相互依存，因此缺乏「獨立性」卻能「單獨」行使職權所致，故提出設置「外部監察人」制度之方向以為參考；並對審計委員會之成員獨立董事得單獨召集股東會之授權產生疑慮，並提出己見。

The shareholders’ meeting is statutory required to a company, which has been given the right to attend the recognition of the financial statements, election or the dismissal of the chairman and ombudsman, etc. Thus, to implement the “Shareholder Activism”, “Shareholder Democracy”, and corporate governance, the shareholders are in a highly important status to a company. The legitimate right to call for a shareholder’s meeting is thus a very important right since the meeting is the highest authority of the corporate governance. Therefore, to ensure the right aforementioned rests on proper entity or members certainly is the key to the success of the corporate governance. In addition to the implement the rights and duties being given to the shareholders, this paper is based on the shareholder disputes case of HeySong Corporation happened in 2010. This thesis will discuss problems from the occurrence and the further development of the case. Furthermore, in the year of 2006, the Security and Exchange Act of the Republic of China (R.O.C.) has recommended the independent directors to form an audit committee to replace the ombudsman, to resolve the overflown powers. According to the Securities and Exchange Act Article 14 paragraph 4 of 4 permitted the provisions of section 220 Companies Act, the audit committee must being formed by a group of independent directors, and the members must not perform individually. Therefore, this thesis has concluded that the most of the problems between the companies and the shareholders are basically because the ombudsmen are performing individually rather than independently as a group. Thus, this thesis propose that we shall engage external-ombudsmen, to prevent the problems mentioned in the article.