從家族控股與董監酬勞的角度探討代理問題與股利政策的關聯性

Abstract

本研究旨在驗證公司透過股利政策來降低代理問題的成效如何。過去文獻針對此類議題多單純以管理階層會因職權之便而有侵蝕股東權益的行為來探討，本文則發展出兩個觀點：一、家族控制股權程度不同，剝削行為會有差異，二、領取高額董監事酬勞是家族企業型態中，剝削股東權益常見的方式；故樣本區分方式有兩類，第一類為將家族控制股權分為介於10%到20%之間的公司、20%到50%之間的公司以及50%以上的公司之三組樣本；第二類為不同獲利能力之下，將樣本分為董監酬勞高與董監酬勞低。股利政策影響因素之研究發現為：一、家族控制股權10%~20%透過股利政策降低代理問題效果最佳；二、公司必須有足夠的獲利才能發放現金股利；三、公司沒有豐厚獲利之下，董監酬勞過高會侵蝕現金股利的發放。本文亦比較不同樣本之下的內部治理機制對公司績效的影響，來檢視代理問題的嚴重程度，實證發現：一、家族控制股權20%~50%的公司，代理問題最為嚴重，但內部治理機制的效果最差；二、董監酬勞高的公司顯示因家族控制席次越高導致公司績效不佳的現象較明顯；三、董監酬勞低的公司顯示內部治理機制的效果較佳。

In this study, we examine how effectively a firm can mitigate its agency problems by means of dividend policies. Most studies regarding this issue focus mainly on the context in which management abuses power to expropriate shareholders' equity. We have two different perspectives. First, behaviors of expropriation vary with family ownership. Second, for family business, equity expropriation is mostly done by paying high compensation to directors and supervisors. We, in this sense, partition our samples in two ways. First, based on family ownership, firms are divided into three groups with ownership between 10% and 20%, between 20% and 50%, and over 50%. Second, based on compensation to directors and supervisors, firms with different profitability are divided into two groups with high compensation and low compensation. Three results are found. First, firms with family ownership between 10% and 20% are the most effective in reducing agency problems by means of dividend policies. Second, firms should have sustainable profits before paying cash dividends. Third, without abundant profits, excess compensation erodes cash payout. We also examine the severity of agency problems by looking at, in different samples, the impact of internal corporate governance mechanism on firm performance. Three results are found. First, firms with family ownership between 20% and 50% show the highest severity of agency problems and the lowest effectiveness of internal corporate governance mechanism. Second, the phenomenon that more seats of family control lead to poorer firm performance is more obvious in firms with high compensation to directors and supervisors. Third, firms with low compensation show better effectiveness of internal governance mechanism.