CEO 內部負債之決定因素

Abstract

自Jensen和Meckling學者1976年對於代理成本的定義後，多數學者皆專注於討論權益薪酬與公司績效間的關係，而內部負債則相對受到忽視。並且在2006年關於CEO薪酬揭露的法規改革之前，學者由於無法取得關於遞延薪酬之數據，使得內部負債之實證研究受到限制。 因此本研究自ExecuComp及Compustat資料庫蒐集2010年全美S&P500公司(去除金融相關產業)自2006年到2010年高階經理人遞延薪酬、退休金計畫及公司數據，共1906筆資料，使用複迴歸分析探討數個可能影響CEO內部負債薪酬的因素。結果發現CEO退休金、遞延薪酬、內部負債及財務槓桿等代表內部負債之變數均與公司流動性呈現負向顯著關係；而其並與公司財務槓桿呈正向顯著關係，證實先前學者認為當公司財務槓桿較大時，較傾向於使用內部負債以減少債務的代理成本；另外，本研究結果並顯示CEO退休金、內部負債與財務槓桿均與年齡呈現正向顯著關係；CEO是否兼任董事與累積退休金之現值呈現正向顯著關係。 並且，我們使用同樣的數據進行迴歸分析探討自2006年到2010年各年度CEO內部負債與公司績效間的關係，結果顯示在2006、2007年時，公司總資產報酬率與CEO內部負債之金額呈現正向不顯著關係，而在2008、2009及2010年時，則呈現正向顯著關係，其結果與本研究假設相符合，我們認為是由於內部負債具有減緩負債之代理成本之功能，因此在金融危機過後，公司為了減少CEO之涉險行為，因此傾向於增加CEO之內部負債與公司績效間的正向連結。

Since the publication of Jensen and Meckling in 1976, which defined the meaning of agency problem, a vast academic literature has focused on the relation between equity-based compensation and firm performance. However, inside debt, which represents the debt-based compensation of CEOs, had been disregarded for a long time. Moreover, before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandated firms to disclose the information about pensions and deferred compensation, we were not allowed to have the accurate data of deferred compensation, which limited the empirical research of inside debt. Our sample comes from ExecuComp、Compustat data bases from 2006 to 2010. The sample consists of 1906 firm-year observations with CEO pensions and deferred compensation data which contains S&P500 company data except finance companies. We use multiple regression analysis to discuss the determinants of CEO pension and deferred compensation. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find a negative relationship between firm liquidity and five factors that represent the amounts or ratios of inside debt, including CEO pension, deferred compensation, inside debt and CEO leverage; We also find a positive association between CEO age and CEO pension, inside debt and CEO leverage; When CEO is also a director in the company, the amounts of CEO pension tend to be higher; When CEO is male, the amounts of CEO pension tend to be lower. Besides, we discuss the relationship between CEO inside debt and firm performance. The results show that return on assets of a firm is not related to CEO inside debt in year 2006 and 2007, and is positively related to inside debt in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Consistent with our predictions that since CEOs with large inside debt holdings prefer policies that are less risky, after financial crisis, companies tend to relate CEO inside debt and firm performance to decrease risky policies.