整合概念的多角化併購對供應鏈及競爭對手的影響—以Google併購Motorola為例

Abstract

多角化併購可能產生範疇效益或是封鎖效果，然而大部分的研究都著重在討論其造成的市場績效，較少文章討論此兩種效果對供應鏈及競爭對手的影響。本篇研究主要在於具垂直特性的多角化併購將對其客戶及競爭對手有何影響，並以2011 Google用125億收購Motorola Mobile的案子為例。 主要使用事件研究法討論此併購案及衍生的8個事件，皆為關於Android客戶和競爭對手後續的策略佈局，去觀察整個手機市場因此併購案造成的改變。 實證結果發現實質的客戶—手機製造商中，市占率較高的品牌手機廠並無顯著反映，但其他品牌手機製造商分享了此併購案產生範疇效果，因Google增加的專利數可以保護Android系統不受專利侵權訴訟影響。對於競爭對手而言，尚未有明確結論。但對於市占率持續下滑的手機製造商，此舉增加了其被併購的潛在價格，因此有正面的影響。 總結本篇文章，結合了多角化併購及其對供應鏈及競爭對手的影響，從不同的觀點來研究多角化併購產生的綜效對市場的影響。

For conglomerate merger, past literatures usually discuss the market performance affected by scope benefit or foreclosure effect, and few discuss the impact from them on supply chain and rivals. Therefore, this paper takes an example of Google –Motorola’s merger deal, with 12.5 billion in 2011, to examine the impact on acquiring firm’s customer and its rivals from scope benefit and foreclosure effect, which generated by a conglomerate merger but actual vertical in disguise We use event study as our methodology to find the stock market evidence for the merger and the following 8 events, which are all about the strategy move of Google’s customers and its rivals. The result shows that for the customer in reality, the 5 largest manufactures didn’t have significant reaction while the other manufacturers shared the scope benefit of this merger, for they can benefit from the increase patents for protecting Android system from patent-infringement suit. It isn’t a consistent and significant result for Android’s rivals. However, there is positive impact on the rivals which lost their competitive advantage, for their potential tender offer price has raised by this merger. To sum up this paper, we combine the conglomerate merger and the supply chain to observe market performance from a different view.