進入雙面市場上的關鍵效應

Abstract

We investigate a market entry scenario where a technologically-superior new platform can overcome its installed base disadvantage through its “keystone effect” advantage over the incumbent in a market that also exhibits indirect network effects. This is an application of the ecological keystone species concept to business ecosystems where the effects of keystone species lack empirical quantification. After adapting a dynamic economic model from Zhu & Iansiti (2011) to fit these market conditions, we map a market landscape that shows the internal condition (entrant’s keystone effect) and external conditions (incumbent’s keystone effect and indirect network effects) under which a new platform can successfully enter (i.e., maintain oligopoly or monopoly share) or fail to enter the two-sided market in a winner-takes-all scenario. We then illustrate the model’s applicability by examining the entry of Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) into the mobile telecommunications market in both the United States and the global market, employing recent data from 2009 to 2011. We find that WiMAX’s keystone effect disadvantage and the market’s indirect network effects were cumulatively strong enough to prevent the new technology standard from successfully competing with the incumbent (3G) for oligopoly or monopoly share in the long run.

We investigate a market entry scenario where a technologically-superior new platform can overcome its installed base disadvantage through its “keystone effect” advantage over the incumbent in a market that also exhibits indirect network effects. This is an application of the ecological keystone species concept to business ecosystems where the effects of keystone species lack empirical quantification. After adapting a dynamic economic model from Zhu & Iansiti (2011) to fit these market conditions, we map a market landscape that shows the internal condition (entrant’s keystone effect) and external conditions (incumbent’s keystone effect and indirect network effects) under which a new platform can successfully enter (i.e., maintain oligopoly or monopoly share) or fail to enter the two-sided market in a winner-takes-all scenario. We then illustrate the model’s applicability by examining the entry of Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) into the mobile telecommunications market in both the United States and the global market, employing recent data from 2009 to 2011. We find that WiMAX’s keystone effect disadvantage and the market’s indirect network effects were cumulatively strong enough to prevent the new technology standard from successfully competing with the incumbent (3G) for oligopoly or monopoly share in the long run.