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dc.contributor.authorMohammad, Zeyaden_US
dc.contributor.authorChen, Yaw-Chungen_US
dc.contributor.authorHsu, Chien-Lungen_US
dc.contributor.authorLo, Chi-Chunen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-08T15:07:02Z-
dc.date.available2014-12-08T15:07:02Z-
dc.date.issued2010-05-01en_US
dc.identifier.issn0256-4602en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.4103/0256-4602.62786en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/5498-
dc.description.abstractIn NRSC24, Elkamchouchi et al. proposed a new approach for key controlled agreement to provide key control in the Pour public key distribution system. In NRSC25, they further proposed an efficient and confirmed protocol for authenticated key agreement to provide forward secrecy in their previously proposed protocol. This paper, however, will show that Pours protocol and Elkamchouchi et al.s two protocols cannot withstand key compromise impersonation resilience, and man-in-the-middle attacks, and do not have perfect forward secrecy resilience. To eliminate the pointed out security leaks, we further propose a new two-pass authenticated key agreement with a key confirmation protocol. The proposed protocol has the following properties: (i) it is proved to be secure against above attacks and stronger adversary attacks, and provides the desirable security properties as a three-pass authenticated key agreement protocol. (ii) It can provide entity authentication and assurance for key reception in an indirect way. (iii) It can withstand denial of service attacks. In addition, we also propose a derivation one-pass protocol from the proposed two-pass protocol to fit a one-way communication channel, which is suitable for mobile stations and electronic business transactions. The security and the computational complexities of the proposed two protocols outperform those of previously proposed protocols.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectDiffie-Hellmanen_US
dc.subjectEntity authenticationen_US
dc.subjectKey agreementen_US
dc.subjectKey compromise impersonation resilienceen_US
dc.subjectMan-in-the-middle attacken_US
dc.subjectPerfect forward secrecy resilienceen_US
dc.titleCryptanalysis and Enhancement of Two-pass Authenticated Key Agreement with Key Confirmation Protocolsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.4103/0256-4602.62786en_US
dc.identifier.journalIETE TECHNICAL REVIEWen_US
dc.citation.volume27en_US
dc.citation.issue3en_US
dc.citation.spage252en_US
dc.citation.epage265en_US
dc.contributor.department資訊管理與財務金融系 註:原資管所+財金所zh_TW
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Information Management and Financeen_US
dc.identifier.wosnumberWOS:000277612300008-
dc.citation.woscount1-
Appears in Collections:Articles