政府之獎勵措施對臺灣積體電路業廠商融資行為之影響研究

Abstract

在過去有關企業融資行為的研究中，鮮少是以政府租稅優惠政策的角度去觀察企業的融 資行為。政府之所以會有租稅優惠措施，其本意在於鼓勵企業持續投資在本業的擴充上， 然企業是否繼續投資的關鍵考量往往在於風險與報酬的高低，而政府即是欲藉由租稅優惠 措施給予企業在資金方面的獎勵，幫助減少企業的財務風險，提高廠商投資的意願，因此 政府的獎勵優惠措施可能間接地影響了廠商的融資行為。關於此問題，以往的研究並無一 定論，故本篇論文即在探討此可能之影響。 在台灣，積體電路業為政府一手扶植的產業，政府對該產業的影響甚深，因此，本研 究嘗試以政府租稅優惠政策的角度去探討對台灣積體電路產業廠商融資行為的影響。所選 擇的租稅優惠措施包括了五年免稅、投資租稅抵減等措施。本篇論文實證之後所獲致的結 果為(1)五年免稅之獎勵措施對積體電路產業廠商的獲利情形的確有顯著的助益，然而其 負債比率並未顯著下降，此足以顯示廠商並未因五年免稅優惠措施之實施而顯著提高其自 有資金佔所有融資來源的比例。(2)加速折舊、投資租稅抵減等優惠措施使得積體電路產 業廠商之獲利情形顯著改善，且亦使負債比率顯著降低，顯見非負債性租稅利益對積體電 路業廠商提高自有資金佔所有融資來源之比例有所助益，但在繼續深入探究後，本研究發 現其影響只到一定的程度。 It is common for governments to use various incentive programs to stimulate the growth of certain industries. Generally, the incentive programs involve favorable treatment in tax either through reduction of tax rate, tax exemption , acceleration of depreciation, or investment tax credit. The direct impact of these measures is believed to be a change in a firm's investment behavior. However, it is argued in this paper that the incentive programs might also have an indirect impact on the financing behavior of the underlying firm. In this thesis, I established two hypotheses concerning the impact of government tax incentive programs on the financing behavior of business firms. These hypotheses followed the rationale of pecking order theory. Data of Taiwan IC firms are then collected to empirically test the hypotheses. The results of the study indicate that: (1) Five-year tax exemption has a significant and positive influence on IC firms'profit ability, but the debt ratio doesn't decrease significantly. These show that the firms don't raise the proportion of internal funds of all financing resources. (2) Accelerated-depreciation and investment tax credit improve the firms' profit ability and decrease the debt ratio, and these show that the two incentive programs make the firms increase the internal funds of all financing resources. After further studying, we find that the influence is limited.