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dc.contributor.authorChang, Ming-Chungen_US
dc.contributor.authorHu, Jin-Lien_US
dc.contributor.authorTzeng, Gwo-Hshiungen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-08T15:08:45Z-
dc.date.available2014-12-08T15:08:45Z-
dc.date.issued2009-09-01en_US
dc.identifier.issn0219-6220en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219622009003545en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/6698-
dc.description.abstractBecause of a deterioration in the quality of the environment, this paper studies the effects of the environment and the economy on environmental technology licensing in a homogeneous Cournot duopoly model in order to reduce environmental pollution and hence improve social welfare. To this end, two licensing methods - namely, a fixed-fee licensing method and a royalty licensing method - are compared. It is found that a high emission tax rate induces the innovator to not license the environmental technology to the licensee under the fixed-fee licensing method. As for social welfare, a large innovation scale of environmental technology does not guarantee that social welfare will be maximized. Finally, a large innovation scale of environmental technology is likely to increase consumer surplus if the marginal environmental damage is significant. Consumers are likely to prefer royalty licensing to fixed-fee licensing. This conclusion differs from Wang's finding in 2002.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectlicensingen_US
dc.subjectinnovationen_US
dc.subjectfixed-feeen_US
dc.subjectroyaltyen_US
dc.titleDECISION MAKING ON STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY LICENSING: FIXED-FEE VERSUS ROYALTY LICENSING METHODSen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1142/S0219622009003545en_US
dc.identifier.journalINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & DECISION MAKINGen_US
dc.citation.volume8en_US
dc.citation.issue3en_US
dc.citation.spage609en_US
dc.citation.epage624en_US
dc.contributor.department經營管理研究所zh_TW
dc.contributor.department科技管理研究所zh_TW
dc.contributor.departmentInstitute of Business and Managementen_US
dc.contributor.departmentInstitute of Management of Technologyen_US
dc.identifier.wosnumberWOS:000270953100011-
dc.citation.woscount6-
Appears in Collections:Articles