建構BOT計畫政府與特許公司財務決策模型

Abstract

政府公佈「促進民間參與公共建設法(簡稱促參法)」並在相關子法明定自償率之意義與公式後，自償率(self-liquidation ratio, SLR)便成為政府推動BOT建設計畫之最重要指標，由於過去立基於此一指標之BOT特許權議題決策模式缺乏決策效率且因公式訂定內容而造成決策錯誤，故本研究希望提出一套全新的決策模式取代自償率決策模式，以強化特許權契約議約初期政府與民間雙方的決策效果與效率。本研究從財務現金流量觀念出發，使用數學解析和數學規劃方法，建構BOT計畫政府與特許公司雙方之財務決策模式，從超額利潤與財務回收觀點尋找政府與特許公司的興建期出資比例與權利金的解和彼此間的議價空間，同時模式可解釋政府與特許公司雙方之建設期出資比例、權利金、政府財務回收率與特許公司可得之計畫淨現值之間的關係。另外，定義一投資評估指標--政府財務回收率用以代替自償率，顯示政府自身可從該BOT計畫投資與回收的能力。本研究並以台北港貨櫃儲運中心BOT案為實證研究對象，備供實務界參考。

Self-liquidation ratio (SLR) is one of the most important indicators to determine the investment cost for BOT projects in Taiwan. Since the current concession decision-making model based on SLR is inefficient and misleading, this study develops new models for government and concessionaires to determine their own investment cost and royalty so that they could negotiate based on their amounts. This study uses the financial cash flow concept、 mathematical analytic approach and linear programming model to develop the financial decision-making models of government and concessionaires. We look for the bargain spaces of investment cost and royalty for government and the concessionaires in premium viewpoint. The models developed in this study can explain the relationships among investment cost, royalty, government finance recovery ratio and net present value of the BOT project. It also defines an investment indicator named government finance recovery ratio (GFRR) for government to do the cost-benefit analysis. To illustrate the models in application, we conduct a case study for the container terminal in Taipei port to find the solutions of investment cost, royalty, and GFRR. The case study shows the investment cost, royalty, and GFRR in the new models can be used to interpret the financial characters for the BOT projects.