台灣半導體產業垂直分工之研究

Abstract

本研究的目的，在於探討臺灣半導體產業的垂直分工模式。垂直分工的經營模式在世界競爭日益激烈的市場中是一種創新模式，過去的文獻絕大多數在於討論垂直整合，對於垂直分工之形成原因及造成影響少有討論。 台灣半導體產業規模高居全世界第四名，其所採行垂直分工的經營模式在全球半導體產業中獨樹一格。然隨著世界市場競爭之日益劇烈，業者在面對此快速變遷之環境，莫不積極於價格與非價格策略的調整，以提昇企業整體之競爭；其中非價格因素的競爭包括：包括增進品質、遵循既有規範或快速回應等來提昇其競爭優勢。為了達成競爭優勢目標，業界採行一系列的創新措施，如：採用先進設備、進行內部組織改進及外部關係改善的經營模式策略調整。 針對研究主題「台灣半導體產業垂直分工之研究」，本論文提出一個垂直分工的價格模型來解釋台灣的半導體垂直分工現象。此模式乃植基於Cournot-Nash 平衡，試圖藉由整合與分工家數與市場價格之關係，以探討市場IC價格因垂直分工所造成的改變。研究結果發現：當上游IC設計業之家數超過產業內總IC公司數的半數，同時超過下游IC製造業的家數時，市場IC價格即會下降。 此外，亦進一步釐清五個會造成台灣半導體產業垂直分工的非價格因素，包括：（1）群聚效應、（2）科技的快速改變、（3）投資成本與門檻的顯著增加、（4）IC設計業的出現及（5）政府的大力支持。對於台灣在IC設計方面的競爭力，亦對其所涉略相關專利做一分析，研究的結果發現，臺灣在IC設計方面的專利數為全世界排名第二。 研究結果將有助於台灣半導體產業釐清其未來之挑戰及方向，進而以此做為決策活動調整的基礎，同時並對產業結構之問題及未來科技發展提出討論。最後，應用內容分析方式嘗試探討台灣晶圓代工業赴中國大陸投資所可能產生的機會與挑戰，總結發現核准晶圓代工業赴大陸投資之決策過程中，政治的考量仍為最重要的因素。

Survival in highly competitive markets requires producers to focus on both price and non-price factors such as quality, innovation, adherence to standards and rapid response as the basis for competitive advantage. In an effort to meet these new demands, firms are deploying a range of innovations including advanced equipment and reconfiguration of business model, such as both their internal organization and their external relationships. Vertical disintegration business model is one of the innovations in such a competitive market. While the literature has devoted much attention to vertical integration, there has been little study on the causes and effects of vertical disintegration. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry has been prominent and ranks number four in the world. The vertical disintegration model of Taiwan’s semiconductor is a very unique one among the integrated circuit industries around the world. The objective of this dissertation is to study the vertical disintegration model of Taiwan’s semiconductor industries. An introduction of the IC foundry and IC fabless was included in this report. An overview of Taiwan’s semiconductor industries as well as the role of the Taiwanese government in the industries was introduced. A model which there are both integrated (IDM) and unintegrated (IC foundry and IC fabless separated) firms was presented. A vertical disintegration model in which there is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium at both stages of production, upstream (IC design) and downstream (IC fabrication), has been proposed to explain analytically the market price changes subjected to vertical disintegration. It was suggested that the market price of the integrated circuit decreases if the numbers of IC fabless firms are more than half of the total IC firms and are more than the numbers of IC manufacturing firms. By spinning off the equipment division which needs a high capital, the semiconductor company can actually make profits by concentrating more on the increasingly complex integrated circuit designs. The disintegrated foundry companies can provide advantages of more specialty, higher quality, lower cycle time and good cooperation relations for the IC fabless firms. Five non-price factors leading to the vertical disintegration of Taiwan’s semiconductor industries have also been proposed: (1) industrial localization and cluster, (2) fast changes of technology, (3) significant increase of development cost, (4) emergence of IC fabless, and (5) government’s support. A patent analysis was also completed to investigate the relative competitiveness of Taiwan’s IC fabless industry in the global market. The vertical disintegration of integrated circuits is expected to be the trend for future for semiconductor manufacturing. In addition, the future challenges and directions of Taiwan’s semiconductor industries were also identified. The structural and institutional problems of the innovation system were identified. Future directions of technology development were also discussed. Finally, the opportunities and dangers of Taiwan’s semiconductor investing in China, and the decision making process of lifting the ban were presented. It was concluded that the decision making process of Taiwan’s wafer investment in China still depends highly on the political process.