盈餘管理是否能有效減少多角化折價?

Abstract

過去文獻普遍聚焦在靜態的多角化議題;但本研究認為動態的部門增加更能詮釋公司在多角化策略上的改變。部門增加時管理者欲透過盈餘管理美化財報，藉此誤導投資人多角化並不會造成折價，但研究結果顯示盈餘管理造成多角化公司財報之透明度降低但市場依然能有效率地反應多角化折價的事實。本研究亦用SIC code前兩碼將部門增加分為同產業和不同產業增加，發現部門同產業增加多角化折價較多，原因來自於其盈餘管理的情況比部門不同產業增加更為明顯，表示財報透明度降低會造成多角化更多的折價。

Previous literature focused on static diversification, which defined that multi-segment firms are corporate diversification. Nevertheless, this paper assumes that only dynamic segment-increasing firms can explain definitely the change in diversification strategy. Managers will window dress the firm’s value through earnings management to mislead investor that diversification does not result in the discount in the firm’s value. Results showed that transparency in financial report will actually lessen through earnings management. However, the market still effectively reveals the truth in diversification discount. Moreover, related and unrelated segment-increasing firms are distinguished by two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. The loss in related segment-increasing firms is larger because they manipulate earnings management more seriously than unrelated segment-increasing firms do. Hence, we show that lesser transparency in financial reporting will cause larger discount in the firm’s value because of diversification.