沙賓與陶德法蘭克法案對金融產業經理人薪酬影響之研究

Abstract

本論文主要探討沙賓與陶德法蘭克法案通過對金融產業經理人薪酬的影響。沙賓法案著重於公司治理與內部控制的改革，倘有不符合會計準則的財務報表，得對經理人追討薪酬，以及權益相關薪酬的給予必須揭露；陶德法蘭克法案則是在金融海嘯發生後對美國金融產業的改造及增強對投資人的保護，對承受過高風險暴露的經理人，要求嚴格揭露其薪酬。法案的通過會影響經理人的決策，進而影響公司表現，在給予激勵薪酬的前提下，就會對經理人薪酬造成影響。過去的文獻都著重於沙賓法案對非金融產業經理人薪酬的影響，本篇加入陶德法蘭克法案並探討兩項法案的通過對金融產業經理人薪酬之影響。本篇結論指出，沙賓與陶德法蘭克法案的通過會讓公司傾向以固定薪酬補償與替代變動薪酬，並降低經理人進行風險性的投資及公司表現；而規模較大與給予變動薪酬比例較高的公司，受到法案通過的影響會比較顯著。

This paper investigates whether there are any effects for SOX and Dodd-Frank Act on CEO compensation in banking and insurance sectors. Although, SOX focused on reforms for corporate governance and internal control, executive compensation was partly regulated by the law. Dodd-Frank Act required the financial institutions to follow a large number of disclosure rules to eliminate CEO’s high risk exposure. The passage of laws will affect CEO’s decisions and thus the firm performance. Based on pay for performance, executive compensation will be affected. We find that there will be declines of risky investment by CEOs and firm performance and thus decreases of variable compensation after the passage of SOX and Dodd-Frank Act. Firms will tend to give CEOs more fixed compensation to compensate the decreasing variable compensation in the post-SOX and Dodd-Frank periods. Further, Firms of bigger size and higher percentage of variable pay will be more significantly affected after the passage of two enacted laws.