自願性設置審計委員會對企業價值與風險的影響

Abstract

我國公司法原採雙軌制，為了落實公司內部控制與健全企業監督效能，我國主管機關於2006年起修訂證交法，正式引進審計委員會制度取代監察人，期初由企業自行評估是否設置審計委員會。然而，企業自行決定是否設立審計委員會，將使樣本產生內生性與自我選擇偏誤的問題，因此本文採用Heckman model以修正傳統最小平方法致使之偏誤。此外，我們進一步以資訊透明度評等及董事長控制力強度作為樣本區分之標準，試圖探討公司在不同資訊揭露程度與不同經營特性下，自願性設置審計委員會對企業價值與風險的影響是否有異。據研究結果顯示，自願性設置審計委員會對於公司風險可有效降低，且效果較提升公司績效更為顯著，而公司資訊透明度越高，審計委員會對公司績效與風險之影響越明顯；此外，若僅比較設立審計委員會前後，則發現原資訊評等較低的公司，其設立後績效與風險改善效果較具；最後，當企業董事長控制力越強，將限制審計委員會職能發揮，致使公司績效及風險無法有效改善。

In 2006, the authorities revised the Securities and Exchange Act to introduce the audit committee system for the purpose of improving internal control and the corporate governance.However, the companies could decide whether to adopt the audit committee system at first, it will probably lead the sample existing endogenous and self-selection problem. Therefore, this paper used Heckman model to correct the bias of least squares. In addition, we have further examined the impact of audit committee under different information transparency and leader’s power.The result of our research revealed that, voluntarily setting audit committee could statistically reduce the corporations risk, even better than improve their performance. Besides that, the companies with higher extent of information transfer,the effect is more significant.We also find that the adoption audit committee firms, originally in lower transparency extent before setting, the improvement is superior to those formerly with higher transparency. Finally, according to the results, when the firm’s leader is more powerful, it might constrain the audit committee function leading to limited improvement.