集團企業與關係人交易個案分析：現代汽車的公司治理

Abstract

本研究即探討韓國企業公司治理現況，藉由現代汽車集團之個案，分析其公司治理制度與經營模式，進而探討其關係人交易個案與影響，並提出個案結論與建議。

現代汽車集團為目前韓國第二大集團企業， 2006年現代汽車集團總裁鄭夢九利用與其子公司Hyundai Glovis間的關係人交易來產生巨大利益並規避遺產稅收，導致現代汽車集團及其子公司造成4000多億韓元的經濟損失。本研究發現個案發生的主要原因，除了鄭夢九為了將財力與權力轉移至其子鄭義宣，並從中得利外，其收購Hyundai Glovis計畫亦未經董事會決議，顯示現代汽車集團之公司治理制度擁有許多漏洞，且當時韓國缺乏公司機會準則，無法確切認定收購行為是否屬現代汽車集團的商業機會。

然而雖然此弊案造成了集團龐大的損失，但卻因為集團企業對於韓國經濟的影響力過大，對於鄭夢九的判決過於寬鬆。因此若欲改善集團企業內的不當交易行為，則須改變韓國整個社會經濟結構才能完全根治，否則只能從外在法律規範來約束公司經理人。而台灣集團企業雖不像韓國掌握了國家整體經濟命脈，但為避免類似弊案的發生，應著手修訂關於忠實義務之規範，避免管理者為己利剝奪公司機會，進而造成公司損失。

This research attempts to study the corporate governance of Korean companies. A study case with Hyundai Motor Group is conducted by analyzing its corporate governance and business model to identify the impacts of related party transactions and propose some conclusions and suggestions.

Hyundai Motor Group is the second largest business group in South Korea. In 2006, Mong-koo Chung, chairman of Hyundai Motor Group gained huge private wealth and avoided inheritance tax through related party transactions created by Hyundai Glovis. It caused that Hyundai Motor Groups and its affiliates suffered ₩400 billion losses. The main reasons of this case were that Mong-koo Chung needed to lay more foundation for his son, Eui-seon Chung, to become his only heir. And he acquired the shares of Hyundai Glovis without reporting to the board of directors. Moreover, ‘Corporate Opportunity Doctrine’ did not exist in South Korea at that time.

Although the case caused great loss to Group, the courts had been overly lenient to Mong-koo Chung because Korean business groups still operate as one giant entity. Therefore, in order to solve this kind of case social and economic structure of South Korea should be change, or there should have regulations to restrict managers’ activities. Also, Taiwan should legislate against that managers seize the company’s opportunity for their own benefit and cause losses of companies.