接受者的確定性與團體成員身份對於獨裁者賽局決策的影響

Abstract

本研究以修改版的獨裁者賽局來探討接受者確定性(recipient certainty)和接受者的成員身份(recipient membership)對個體決策自私傾向的影響。在實驗一中，接受者的確定性是以決定接受者的時間點(在獨裁者做出決策之前或之後決定)來操弄。結果顯示，當接受者是匿名的陌生人時，相對於在「不確定接受者」(uncertain recipient)情境中，台灣的大學生在「確定接受者」(certain recipient)情境下，表現出較為自私的行為傾向，即分配較少的金錢給接受者。此發現與原本研究預測相反，為探究可能的原因，進行了第二個實驗。實驗二的目的在檢驗接受者的內/外團體成員身份是否會是影響實驗一中台灣的大學生的決策。實驗結果顯示，當接受者是陌生人，即接受者是外團體成員(out-group member)時，參與者的表現與實驗一相同，他們分配給確定的接受者的金錢，顯著少於分配給不確定的接受者的金錢。然而，當接受者是內團體成員(in-group member)時，參與者分配給確定的接受者的金錢，則反而顯著多於分配給不確定的接受者的錢。由此結果推論，似乎在集體主義文化社會中，例如台灣，接受者的確定性對獨裁者賽局決策的影響性會被接受者是內團體或外團體成員身份所調節(moderated)。

Effects of recipient certainty and recipient membership on selfishness were examined using a modified dictator game. In Experiment 1, recipient certainty was manipulated by whether recipients were determined before or after dictators made their decisions. Results showed that when recipients were anonymous strangers, dictators from Taiwan were less altruistic in a certain-recipient condition than in an uncertain-recipient condition, a finding that was counter to our prediction. Experiment 2 was designed to examine whether recipient membership was the factor affecting Taiwanese participants’ decisions in Experiment 1. Results showed that when recipients were strangers (out-group members) as in Experiment 1, dictators still allotted less money to certain recipients than to uncertain recipients. However, when recipients were in-group members, dictators allotted more money to certain recipients than to uncertain recipients. It seems that in a collectivistic culture like Taiwan, people’s responses to recipient certainty in dictator games might be moderated by recipient group membership.