完整後設資料紀錄
DC 欄位語言
dc.contributor.author許愷秢en_US
dc.contributor.authorHsu, Kei-Lingen_US
dc.contributor.author洪瑞雲en_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-12T02:44:32Z-
dc.date.available2014-12-12T02:44:32Z-
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT070153319en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/75960-
dc.description.abstract本研究的目的是探討人在遭遇不公平對待後,若有機會提出抗議,此抗議的行為是否會影響他在擁有決策權時分配決策的公平程度。168名受試者共進行了3回合的賽局。第一回合用來操弄抗議經驗,所有的受試者均擔任獨裁者賽局中的接受者並遭受到不公平對待。實驗組可以選擇對不公平對待提出抗議,控制組則無抗議機會。受試者在第二、三回合均擔任分配者的角色。在第二回合中,以賽局的類型操弄分配者權力的大小;一半的人是權力較大的獨裁者賽局中的分配者,另一半的人是權力較小的最後通牒賽局中的分配者。第三回合賽局則操弄權力大小的變化;一半的人在第三回合權力由大變小(由獨裁者賽局變成最後通牒賽局),另一半人的權力由小變大(由最後通牒賽局變成獨裁者賽局)。結果發現,在擁有分配權時,過去抗議的經驗可顯著的降低分配者在第二回合的自私程度,但此效果到第三回合即不復顯著。受試者擁有的權力大小的主效果也顯著,權力越大者,其分配越自私。且若權力產生變化,則權力由小變大者會惡化其自私程度,權力由大變小者的自私程度則會下降。資料亦顯示,有機會抗議時會提出抗議的人對掌權者的公平與利他性有較高的期待;相對的,有抗議機會但不抗議者對掌權者的公平性的期待偏低。綜合言之,此研究顯示,在不會受到制裁的前提下,抗議經驗是維護一個人掌權時決策公平性的因素之一。zh_TW
dc.description.abstractThe purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of protest experience and power change on distributor’s decision making. One hundred and sixty-eight undergraduate and graduate students participated in the study. All of them completed three games. The first game was to manipulate the protest experience. All participants played the receivers role in a dictator game and received an unfair offer from the dictator. Then, experimental group was given an opportunity to send a protest message to the dictator, while the control group did not have the opportunity to protest. In the following two games, all participants were assigned the distributor’s role and had to make a decision about how to share a sum of money (NT$30000 ~50000) with their partners. In the second game, the power size (large vs. small) was manipulated by the type of game (dictator game vs. ultimatum game) they played. In the third game, the power change was manipulated by a change in the type of game. While half of participants gained power in the third game (from ultimatum game to dictator game), the other half of participants lost power (from dictator game to ultimatum game). The result showed that, participants who chose to protest to the unfair distribution were less selfish in the second game than the control group. but the effect of the protest disappeared in the third game. It suggests that the protest experience can restrain a person’s tendency to make self-interested decision, but this effect is meteoric. Results also showed that how selfish a person is depends on how much power he/she possesses. Larger power breeds larger selfishness. One’s selfishness also varies with one’s power change. As power increases, people become more selfish, and vice versa. However, contrary to the prediction, the interaction between protest experience and power was not significant. Data also showed that participants who protested may have higher expectation of a just or altruistic world than those who chose not to protest. In sum, protest experience appears to be a way to guard against one’s corruption from power gain, under the presumption that there is no retaliation from those in power.en_US
dc.language.isozh_TWen_US
dc.subject抗議經驗zh_TW
dc.subject權力zh_TW
dc.subject自私程度zh_TW
dc.subject最後通牒賽局zh_TW
dc.subject獨裁者賽局zh_TW
dc.subject權力變化zh_TW
dc.subjectprotest experienceen_US
dc.subjectpoweren_US
dc.subjectselfishnessen_US
dc.subjectultimatum gameen_US
dc.subjectdictator gameen_US
dc.subjectpower changeen_US
dc.title抗議經驗與權力大小對分配者決策的影響zh_TW
dc.titleThe Effect of Protest Experience and Power Change on Distributor’s Decision-making in games.en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.contributor.department工業工程與管理系所zh_TW
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