公司盈餘管理對其股票流動性之影響效果

Abstract

本研究旨在探討公司盈餘管理行為對其股票流動性之影響。盈餘管理在許多情況下會使公司內部人與外部人之間產生利益衝突，本研究假設盈餘管理程度較高的公司將導致較嚴重的資訊不對稱，市場上的流動性供給者因為預期將面對較高的逆選擇風險，而會加大買賣價差，及致流動性較低。本研究使用2001年美國爆發一連串會計醜聞及2002年美國通過沙賓法案(the Sarbanes-Oxley Act)為樣本期間，實證結果顯示，盈餘管理程度高的公司，其股票確有較高的買賣價差及較低的流動性。

This study sets out to investigate the relationship between earnings management and equity liquidity, positing that as incentives arise for the misrepresentation of firm performance through earnings management, a higher degree of earnings management may signal greater adverse selection costs. If the manipulation of earnings reveals aggressive accounting practices, liquidity providers may tend to widen the bid-ask spreads so as to protect themselves. The empirical results, based upon stocks listed on the NYSE and the NASDAQ, indicate that companies with a high degree of earnings management incur higher trading costs.