財務報表重編與公司治理特性之研究

Abstract

財務報表重編會造成資訊使用者決策錯誤，因此本研究自公司治理角度出發，以發生「錯誤更正」類型之財務報表重編公司為研究對象。本研究先探討財務報表重編宣告對股東財富之影響，再針對三構面—與股東有關、與董事會有關、與總經理有關之管理機制，探討其與財務報表重編之關聯性。 本研究選取1999至2003年度之半年度及年度財務報表重編之上市(櫃)公司共70份作為實驗組，另採取1：1配對方式，選取相同產業、期間、規模之未重編公司作為控制組進行比較。實證結果分述如下： 1.財務報表重編宣告對股東財富之影響 財務報表重編宣告所產生之異常報酬多為負向，且累積異常報酬也呈現明顯的下降趨勢。 2.股東部份之管理機制 (1)財務報表重編公司的總機構投資者持股比例，顯著低於財務報表未重編公司。 (2)財務報表重編公司的外部大股東持股比例，顯著低於財務報表未重編公司。 3.董事會部份之管理機制 (1)財務報表重編公司的董事會規模，顯著高於財務報表未重編公司。 (2)財務報表重編公司的獨立董事比例，顯著低於財務報表未重編公司。 4.總經理部份之管理機制 (1)財務報表重編公司的總經理持股比例，並未顯著高於財務報表未重編公司。 (2)財務報表重編公司的總經理薪資總額，並未顯著高於財務報表未重編公司。 綜上所述，財務報表重編宣告確實具有負面的資訊內涵，會導致利害關係人對企業所報導之財務資訊品質及可靠性產生質疑，而透過完善的公司治理機制將有助於監督公司的運作，並降低財務報表重編的可能性。

The restatement of financial statements will mislead the financial statement users. We first empirically examine the announcement effect of the restatement of financial statements on stockholder’s wealth. We then examine the relationship between the restatement of financial statements and corporate governance mechanisms which are further divided into stockholders’ dimension, Board of directors’ dimension, and CEO’s dimension. We examine a sample of 70 restatements on listed company in the period 1999-2003, together with matched control groups of industry, year and similar size. The empirical results can be summarized as follows: 1. Companies experienced a significantly negative abnormal return when the restatement of financial statements is announced. 2. Stockholders’ dimension: (1) Companies that restated financial statements had significantly lower percentages of institutional stockholders’ holdings than those which did not restate their financial statements. (2) Companies that restated financial statements had significantly lower percentages of outside big stockholders’ holdings than those which did not restate their financial statements. 3. Board of directors’ dimension: (1) Companies that restated financial statements had significantly higher size of board of directors than those which did not restate their financial statements. (2) Companies that restated financial statements had significantly lower percentages of independent directors on the board than those which did not restate their financial statements. 4. CEO’s dimension: (1) Companies that restated financial statements didn’t have significantly higher percentages of CEO’s holding than those which did not restate their financial statements. (2) Companies that restated financial statements didn’t have significantly higher CEO’s compensation than those which did not restate their financial statements.