財務危機與公司治理因素之研究—以高科技集團長期投資為例

Abstract

摘要 台灣高科技電子產業在過去四，五年前過度的操作以及一窩蜂的投下，已產生市場供給與需求的混亂，加上大多數集團企業高階經營任意投資不熟悉的高科技產業，導致營運資金遭到套牢、或高度運用高倍財務槓桿操作成立企業集團過度投資，進而替子母公司護盤或資金轉作他用，甚至不惜將公司資金掏空，導致營運資金調度困難而倒閉，造成台灣經濟及投資環境更加的惡劣，削弱了台灣在國際上的競爭力。本研究以某高科集團公司為案例，個案方式來研究探討高科集團公司之長期轉投資企業，透過詳細資料整理，將長期轉投資發生財務危機之成因及影響有系統的呈現，除了觀察其長期轉投之公司的資本規模資料之外、與集團企業是否同經營者、投資比率與集團之間投資警訊分析，同時也加入重要的公司治理指標，董事會規模及董事席次等資訊表達預警訊息。 本研究選取集團企業公司長期投資之高科技產業31家(23家財務正常公司、8家財務危機公司)為研究樣本，除以個案方式進行其所有權及控制權、重置成本及會計計價模式警訊因子之分析外，同時以Logistic迴歸分析建立預警模型。本研究經過實證模型建立發現：1.正常公司預測率是95.7%，危機公司預測率是100%，整體模型之預測率是96.8%。2.董事席次越高與公司發生危機之可能性呈正相關，集團企業在董事會控制權越高之公司，有較高的剝削程度。3.是否與母集團企業之董事長或經理人同一人與公司發生危機呈負相關。

ABSTRACT In the past four to five years, due to saturated market conditions and over investment in Taiwan's high technology sectors, the phenomenon of too much supply versus demand took place. This scenario exists because many Conglomerate Management Executives invest in the high tech market they are not familiar with tying up of operating capitals. Or these Executives use highly financial leverage to set up Conglomerate, which become over invested. They also attempt to maintain members’ stock price, moving the capital for other financial purposes. Even worse, they are partaking insider trading or accounting fraud. This results in the difficulty of maintaining appropriate operating capital, which usually results in filing bankruptcy. This mismanagement of operating worsens Taiwan's economy and investment environment and lowers Taiwan's international competitiveness. This research project uses one of the conglomerates as the case study to find out the long-term investment related their members. With the use company financial data, we systematically reveal the elements causing financial crises due to the mismanagement of long-term investment. The elements include capital size, and if the management controlled by the same conglomerate management group or not, ownership, and investment within this conglomerate. Also important management goals, size of Board and numbers of Board members are treated as alerts. This study selects 31 members of one high tech conglomerate (23 of them are normal members, 8 of which are with crises) as the case study. Not only we use ownership, restructuring cost, and biding as the alert elements, but also use logistic regression analysis to set up the alert model. The results show: 1.The normal members' forecast rate is 95.7%, the members' with crises is 100%, and within all group forecast rate is 96.8%. 2.The numbers of Board Members have a positive correlation with the financial crises. The more consortium controls the members, the higher the chance to manipulate the members. 3.The same CEO or Chairman of the Conglomerate has a negative correlation with the corporation financial crises.