對手資訊、重複合作與作業結構對蜈蚣賽局決策行為的影響

Abstract

本研究目的是探討在兩人賽局中，當資訊完全透明、確定的情況下，報酬結構、對手資訊及與同一人重複合作對決策行為的影響。以蜈蚣賽局為決策作業，是否與同一人重複進行遊戲二局為組間變項、故事(是否涉及公共利益)、決策作業長度(長、短賽局)、報酬(高、低)、利差變化(隨時間變大、變小或固定)、對手資訊(有、沒有提供)為組內變項，94名受試者隨機組成二人一組，在不知道對手是誰的情況下進行遊戲，以賽局結束時間點為依變數。變異數分析結果發現，作業結構及對手資訊的主效果皆顯著，當賽局涉及公共利益、涉及的利益較小、雙方一開始時利益差距較小、及有對手資訊時，賽局結束的時間點會延後，表現出較高的合作行為。進一步分析交互作用則顯示，只有當賽局有涉及公共利益時，重複對局才能夠延後兩人賽局的結束時間點。此外，在高報酬的賽局中提供對手資訊是毫無作用的，只有在低報酬的賽局中，對手資訊才能提升雙方的合作行為。此研究顯示，不涉及公共利益的私人高報酬是賽局中雙方合作的不利因素。

The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of opponent’s information, repeated collaboration and task structure on Centipede decision making. Ninety-four college students were randomly paired into groups to participate in 50 Centipede games. The games were composed by 2 (stories: third party involved or not) × 2 (long or short game) × 2 (high or low payoffs) × 3 (levels of bilateral benefit difference: increasing, constant, decreasing) × 2 (opponent’s information provided or not). Half of dyads were told that they would play with the same partner twice in the games, while the other half were told that they played with different partner on each game. Results showed that games involved third-party benefit, longer relationship, lower payoff, increasing bilateral benefit, or with opponent’s information, were ended later, indicating greater cooperation between the two players. The interaction effect further showed that repeated collaboration with a partner would prolong the game only if it involved third-party benefit. In addition, opponent’s information might increase cooperation only on games with low payoffs. These findings suggest that high personal payoffs of a game may undermine participant’s tendency to cooperate.