我國環境影響評估審查制度之實証分析

Abstract

我國於1994年12月30日公佈實施之「環境影響評估法」，可謂係我國環境保護法制之里程碑，蓋此法之實施使我國環境法治由原規範環境遭受破壞後所產生損害賠償之公害糾紛處理程序等「事後救濟」法制，正式邁入預先防止環境遭受破壞之環境管理計畫等「事前預防」法制。

我國環境影評估制度目前採取兩階段的審查，並採取完全不同的審查密度與公民參與標準，其中第二階段環評程序遠較一階書面審查嚴謹，且賦予利害關係人更完整的程序保障，但也因此必須耗費較長的審查時間及較高的成本，其中影響是否進入二階的判斷基準便是環評法施行細則第十九條對於本條「重大影響之虞」的解釋，該條文規定認為對於其所例示的事項有「顯著不利影響」者，才需進入二階環評，然而從近年環保署審查案件的數據卻可看出進入二階環評的比例明顯偏低，且許多重大環境爭議如蘇花高，皆未產生此「重大影響之虞」。本研究擬從實證分析的角度，檢視現行中央環評案件審查情形。

本文實證分析分為四大部分，第一部份於第貳章增補既有文獻中之數據，呈現環評審查制度中客觀統計資料及現有重要環評案件判決之分析。第二、三部份分別探討環評審查決策者，亦即環保署下環評委員主觀對於審查制度之看法。第參章進行第六屆環評委員之普查問卷，回收率達57％，問卷內容分別針對目前環境影響評估審查過程進行調查，共計三十一題，含括如環說書製作、審查獨立性等面向，第四章則呈現其中五名問卷回收者所進行之半結構式深度訪談。

最後一部份則在第伍章深入探討蘇花高個案相關審查報告及程序，作為上述實證分析之對照實例，本章分析蘇花高由2000至2008年間，共歷經十一次會議審查過程中，相關實體及程序議題，突顯環說書科學專業性不足、環保署與環評委員會之對立，甚至以各種行政手段協助開發單位推動審查，造成現行環評制度下資源不對等的分配結構。

本研究發現目前環評審查制度完全依賴環說書之專業內容，但環說書之撰寫卻由開發單位進行，容易形成偏向開發之結論，間接造成環境考量基礎研究不足，整體資源嚴重傾斜，違反環評法之意旨。另環評委員為兼職卻需負擔大量案件工作，亦無助理或其他行政資源協助，亦形成審查上的困難。本研究亦認為應加強法院監督之意願及能力，以此維護環評審查所需之專業及客觀性，避免行政部門以政治干預手法介入。本文於第陸章進一步提出未來環評修法之建議及方向，供立法者及後續研究者參考。

The objectivity of science is sometimes characterized by an overly idealistic picture, and the claim of its “objective professionalism” is only nominal and subordinate to political demands. The decision making process of Taiwan’s Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) paints a picture of how the Government uses the seal of “science” and the popular branding of professional procedure without having actual knowledge and expertise to evaluate environmental risks. During the 1980s, a grassroots environmental protest movement swept through Taiwan and with the combined effects of many Parliament members and environmental lobbyists, the EIA was finally enacted. As the democratic process in Taiwan matured, the enacted EIA also became more professional and powerful, as preferred by environmentalists, to meet the proclaimed standard of “science and objectivity” as politics lurked in the disguise of objectivity. EIA regulations strengthened the tendency to blur of the distinction between science and politics. In contrast to EIA legislation in the United States, that sets out only procedural requirements, Taiwanese legislators intended to empower the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to veto ecologically unsound projects, and strengthened its accountability by creating an independent special commission to undertake the EIA examination. The special commissioners, nominated by the academy and civil society, can even reject the development plans proposed by the Executive Yuan, the highest level of executive branch according to its Constitution. However, even with the creation of the special commission, this empirical research found that EIAs conducted in the past fourteen years have not been accountable. More than 87 % of the developments plans passed the Taiwanese EPA’s review without raising any serious environmental concern, including the Su-Hua Highway, which passes through 17 ecologically sensitive areas, 11 faults, a national park and several important habitats for endangered species. By conducting surveys and in-depth interviews with the EIA commissioners, some commissioners reported they usually underwent political pressure during their evaluation and this research also found that certain language was used to describe of adverse environmental impacts so that the environmental assessment documents avoided provoking any tangible response. By Su-Hua Highway case study, my research also showed that while commissioners do acknowledge potentially adverse environmental effects of development projects, they do not have enough competence to question the developer’s assessment without participation from society at large. What’s more, political intervention is not avoidable for such a sensitive case, the authority can adopt new administrative orders and manipulate the “Rules of Order” during the decision making process to pursue their preferred outcome. The conclusion of this research provides several suggestions to improve the EIA including to increase the credibility of environmental assessment reports, enhance the capabilities and resources of commissioners, enlarge the public participation, and empower the judicial power to balance the inappropriate decision making.