外部公司治理、資本結構與公司價值之關聯性

Abstract

公司治理的重要議題之ㄧ即為代理成本的問題。治理較差的公司，其管理者擁有相對較大的權利且不受制於董事會的控管，導致管理者容易做出對公司及股東不利的決策，此行為所引發的公司價值下降現象，即為代理成本理論。根據代理成本理論的假設，在沒有接管威脅的環境下，管理者不會提高負債使行為受限，隱含公司治理差所帶來的代理問題將導致負債減少。而在自由現金流量理論中，則主張透過負債提高所擔保的利息支付，可以有效降低管理者所能自由操控的現金流量，以達到緩和代理成本的目的，隱含公司治理與負債的使用有功能替代的現象。 本文即是在考慮變數間存在內生性問題的情況下，針對公司治理與資本結構的關係進行探討，並觀察這兩者與公司價值間之關聯性。結果顯示，公司治理與負債比之間有顯著的負向關係，代表在以美國公司為樣本的研究中，負債的使用有助於緩和代理問題，故與公司治理為替代關係。

In the free-cash-flow theory, shareholders use debt to discipline managers and maximize firm value. In contrast, managerial models assume that, without a takeover threat, managers will not lever up to constrain themselves. Debt seems to be an efficient mechanism of corporate governance. This paper shows how capital structure is influenced by corporate governance which is measured as the strength of shareholder rights. We also investigate the effect of corporate governance and leverage work on firm value. Our analysis is mindful of the potential endogeneity between firm value, shareholder rights, and debt ratio. The empirical evidence shows an inverse relationship between leverage and shareholder rights, suggesting that firms adopt higher debt ratios where shareholder rights are more restricted. This result is consistent with agency theory, which predicts that leverage helps alleviate agency problems.