科技不確定性與機會主義---關係治理機制節制效果之檢驗

Abstract

企業之間的交易活動，往往因為資訊不對稱（Information Asymmetry）與鎖入效 應（Lock-in Effect）促使交易的一方進行投機行為，即所謂的機會主義 （Opportunism）。為了抑制機會主義，企業通常會透過垂直整合或其他可行的治 理機制，將交易成本降低，以促進交易的效率。但是高科技業如連接器或晶片的 供應商，由於科技變化所產生的高不確定性，其面對的交易對象與採購行為更為 複雜。本研究將針對大中國區的廠商，以問卷調查的方式，將交易機制與機會主 義作一整體性的實證檢驗。鑑於諸多文獻均指出「關係」是在中國經商的關鍵， 本研究假設關係規範在不同的治理機制中是否最具成效，並檢驗「關係治理」機 制是否對機會主義具抑制的能力。

Firms involve in transactions or signing contracts often face problems that may be harmful to both buyer-seller parties such as information asymmetry and lock-in effect. Opportunism is the outcome of these phenomena and will lower the transactions efficiency to a great extent. To reduce the transaction risk, firms generally implement vertical integration or other governance mechanism to lower the transaction costs between two parties thus improves the transaction efficiencies. This research examines the effects of governance mechanisms and transaction opportunism in the Greater China area, especially on the high-tech industry such as semiconductor chips and transistors. Past literature highlighted the importance of “guanxi” in making business with Chinese firms. We follow the same line of reasoning and hypothesize relationship governance as the most effective vehicle in curbing the opportunism. Under conditions of technology uncertainty, we would like to investigate whether guanxi still persists if buyers perceive less supplier opportunism, and vice versa.