NON-EQUIVALENCE OF SPECIFIC AND AD VALOREM TAXATION IN THE COMPETITIVE MARKET WITH TAX EVASION

dc.citation.epage	51	en_US
dc.citation.spage	41	en_US
dc.citation.volume	58	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Huang, Che-Chiang	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Ueng, K. L. Glen	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Hu, Jin-Li	en_US
dc.contributor.department	經營管理研究所	zh_TW
dc.contributor.department	Institute of Business and Management	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2018-08-21T05:54:18Z
dc.date.available	2018-08-21T05:54:18Z
dc.date.issued	2017-06-01	en_US
dc.description.abstract	The well-known equivalence between specific and ad valorem taxation in competitive markets may not hold in the presence of tax evasion. Evading specific taxes has to take place via concealing quantities sold, whereas evading ad valorem taxes can take place via concealing selling prices as well as quantities sold. We show that in the competitive market (i) this difference could make the equivalence of these two taxes break down, and (ii) specific taxation may be superior to ad valorem taxation if it causes firms to channel fewer resources into tax evasion, given other things being equal.	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0018-280X	en_US
dc.identifier.journal	HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	https://ir.lib.nycu.edu.tw/handle/11536/145776
dc.identifier.wosnumber	WOS:000405446300003	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.subject	tax evasion	en_US
dc.subject	ad valorem taxation	en_US
dc.subject	specific taxation	en_US
dc.title	NON-EQUIVALENCE OF SPECIFIC AND AD VALOREM TAXATION IN THE COMPETITIVE MARKET WITH TAX EVASION	en_US
dc.type	Article	en_US

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