Cryptanalysis of the Hwang-Shi proxy signature scheme

dc.citation.epage	134	en_US
dc.citation.issue	2	en_US
dc.citation.spage	131	en_US
dc.citation.volume	53	en_US
dc.citation.woscount	3
dc.contributor.author	Hwang, MS	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Lee, CC	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Hwang, SJ	en_US
dc.contributor.department	資訊工程學系	zh_TW
dc.contributor.department	Department of Computer Science	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2014-12-08T15:41:48Z
dc.date.available	2014-12-08T15:41:48Z
dc.date.issued	2002-11-01	en_US
dc.description.abstract	Recently, Hwang and Shi proposed an efficient proxy signature scheme without using one-way hash functions. In their scheme, an original signer needn't send a proxy certificate to a proxy signer through secure channels. However, there are two public key substitution methods that can be used to attack their scheme. In this article, we show that their scheme is vulnerable to the public key substitution attacks.	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0169-2968	en_US
dc.identifier.journal	FUNDAMENTA INFORMATICAE	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	https://ir.lib.nycu.edu.tw/handle/11536/28428
dc.identifier.wosnumber	WOS:000181132000002
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.subject	cryptography	en_US
dc.subject	digital signature	en_US
dc.subject	one-way hash function	en_US
dc.subject	proxy signatures	en_US
dc.title	Cryptanalysis of the Hwang-Shi proxy signature scheme	en_US
dc.type	Article	en_US

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