公司治理機制與外資持股偏好關聯性之探討

Abstract

本研究以台灣上市上櫃公司爲研究對象，實證探討公司治理機制與外資持股偏好的關係，研究結果顯示：(1)管理者持股比重越高的公司，外資在其投資組合中會給於較高之權重，但當管理者持股超過某一臨界點後，管理者持股比率越高的公司，外資持股比重反而越低，顯示外資不願持有大額控制股東的公司；(2)積極推動獨立董事制度的企業，外資會給予正面評價，其股權結構中會有較高之外資持股比率；(3)董監事質押比重與外資持股偏好呈顯著負相關，反應外資不願持有潛在代理成本的公司；(4)外資不願意持有經理人具有絕對支配力的公司，反而偏好具有外部大額股東來制衡管理者的公司，大額股東持股率與外資持股偏好呈顯著正相關；(5)外資不願持有董事長兼任總經理的公司。

In this paper, we characterize foreign ownership using a data set of ownership and attributes of corporate governance of firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange market. The analysis reveals that: (1) the higher the extent of share held by the manager, the higher weight of foreigner portfolio in the firms, however when the insider ownership is over certain critical levels, increase of insider ownership will lead to a lower foreign ownership, implying that foreign investors tend to avoid firms that have big controlling shareholders; (2) foreigners give positive valuation to firms in aggressively promoting institution of independent directors, the firms which have more independent directors in the board of directors would have more foreign ownership in ownership structures; (3) there is negative relationship between share as collateral by the board of directors and foreign ownership, it indicates that foreign investors don't wish to hold firms which have potential agency cost; (4) foreigners don't prefer to hold the firms which have absolutely dominant manager, but prefer to hold the firms which have outside block stockholders; (5) foreigners don't hold the firms in which chairman and CEO is the same.