董事會獨立性與企業財務危機關係之研究

Abstract

本研究以台灣股票上市、櫃公司自2002年引進獨立董事之後的數據，就董事會獨立性觀點，建構2003年至2005年間的各項解釋變數之縱橫資料 (panel data)，透過二元不連續應變數的羅吉斯模型 (panel-logit model)，探討其與企業財務危機發生可能性的關聯。研究結果顯示，在沒有區分財務危機類型的情況下，獨立董事比率的高低、董事長是否兼任總經理、以及控制權對現金流量請求權偏離程度等公司治理機制，確實攸關財務危機發生的可能性。在進一步對曾經發生過被掏空資產的財務危機公司進行分析的結果顯示，獨立董事比率及控制股東的控制權，皆能有效解釋資產掏空案的發生，尤其是獨立董事的比率，不但統計意義上與掏空公司的財務危機顯著相關，在經濟意義上更是影響重大。對非掏空類型的財務危機而言，則是以董事長不兼任總經理及降低控制權與現金流量請求權之間的偏離程度，才會有明顯遏阻危機發生的效果。整體而言，公司治理變數較財務變數更具有解釋力。

This paper investigates the effect of board independence on financial distress using a sample of Taiwan listed firms, which are required to disclose the status of independent directors starting from the year 2002. By constructing the panel data of lagged explanatory variables during year 2003 to 2005, we employ the panel logit regression analysis. Our evidence indicates that the internal corporate governance variables, especially the proportions of independent directors, CEO duality or not, and the deviation in control away from cash flow rights, significantly relate to the possibility of financial distress for all-sample firms. By classifying all samples into two categories, we further test on one sub-sample in which top executives expropriate the corporate assets; and find that the larger proportions of independent directors and the higher control right of controlling stockholders may lower the incidence of expropriated-assets financial crisis effectively. Above all, the board independence proxy, proportions of independent directors, is strongly significant in both statistical and economical meanings. As to the other sub-sample firms with non-expropriated assets case, the key factors to reduce the likelihood of financial distress are the independent leadership of board chairman and the lower deviation in control away from cash flow rights. In sum, the explanatory power of corporate governance variables is better than that of financial variables in the events of financial distress.