避免報導負盈餘與過度生產行為關聯性之研究：論最終控制股東角色

Abstract

國內一般公認會計原則規定企業財務報表需依照歸納成本制度編製，此規定使得製造業公司管理者有機會藉由囤積商品存貨來降低報導的銷貨成本，進而達成虛增報導盈餘的目標。本研究分析當國內製造業公司面臨報導負盈餘之情境時，管理者是否從事投機性過度生產行為以避免報導負盈餘。其次，鑑於控制股東與少數股東之間的股權代理問題普遍存在於國內上市企業，本研究亦分析控制股東控制權與現金流量權偏離程度，是否會影響製造業公司管理者從事投機性過度生產行為以避免報導負盈餘。本研究以2000年至2008年的國內上市及上櫃製造業公司為樣本進行分析，實證結果發現：製造業公司管理者傾向從事投機性過度生產行為以避免報導負盈餘；在控制股東控制權與現金流量權偏離程度越大的製造業公司，此現象又更為嚴重。

According to Taiwan Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, absorption costing is the required inventory costing method for external financial reporting. Thus, managers can decrease reported cost of goods sold and increase reported income by engaging in excess production. This study aims to investigate whether managers of manufacturing firms resort to excess production (i.e., production in excess of market demand) to avoid reporting annual losses. In light of the fact that the most relevant agency problem may be the one between firms' controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in Taiwan, we also investigate whether managers have higher tendency to engage in opportunistic over-production behavior in order to avoid reporting annual losses when the ultimate controlling shareholder's ownership-control rights diverge. Using a sample of firms listed on the TSE or trading on Taiwan's OTC market from 2000 to 2008, we find that manufacturing firms engage in excess production in order to avoid reporting annual losses, and this phenomenon is more pronounced for manufacturing firms with larger degree of control-ownership disparity.