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dc.contributor.authorChung, Hui-Lingen_US
dc.contributor.authorChen, Hung-Yien_US
dc.contributor.authorHu, Jin-Lien_US
dc.contributor.authorLin, Yan-Shuen_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-21T08:29:14Z-
dc.date.available2015-07-21T08:29:14Z-
dc.date.issued2014-12-01en_US
dc.identifier.issn0018-280Xen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11536/124176-
dc.description.abstractAntitrust authorities consider commodity bundling as an extension of monopoly power to other markets which harms consumers. This paper analyzes quality competition and its effect on consumer surplus for the case of commodity bundling by a multi-product firm in a vertically differentiated industry. When the firm bundles a high quality good, we show that bundling negatively affects the quality of a competing good, consumer surplus, and welfare. When the firm bundles a low quality good instead, bundling raises the quality of a competing good, enhances consumer surplus, and may increase the welfare.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectbundlingen_US
dc.subjectvertical product differentiationen_US
dc.subjectoptimal qualityen_US
dc.subjectconsumer surplusen_US
dc.subjectleverage theoryen_US
dc.titleBUNDLING WITH QUALITY CHOICEen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.journalHITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSen_US
dc.citation.volume55en_US
dc.citation.spage147en_US
dc.citation.epage165en_US
dc.contributor.department經營管理研究所zh_TW
dc.contributor.departmentInstitute of Business and Managementen_US
dc.identifier.wosnumberWOS:000347144200003en_US
dc.citation.woscount0en_US
Appears in Collections:Articles