在資訊成本下CEO雙重性是否影響公司績效

Abstract

近十年，CEO雙重性對於公司績效之影響廣受學者們的研究及討論，然而此議題，不論在理論或實證研究上的結論皆不一致。更甚者，國內外多數實證研究之結果皆顯示CEO雙重性對公司績效並無顯著效果，此結果更是與普遍認知相牴觸，CEO雙重性如同球員兼裁判，在認知上會降低公司績效。本文在檢視相關理論後，發現資訊成本在CEO雙重性影響公司績效上扮演重要角色，因此預期透過資訊成本來探討CEO雙重性與公司績效之間的關係，可消弭實證結果與普遍認知上之衝突。本文之研究對象為臺灣2000年至2012年一般上市櫃公司，資料來自臺灣經濟新報(TEJ)資料庫，並以Panel data的隨機效果模型進行估計。根據實證分析之結果顯示:CEO雙重性與公司績效並無顯著相關，此與過去多數國內外實證研究之結果相同；CEO雙重性會加深資訊成本對於公司績效的負面影響，此結果傾向支持代理理論對於CEO雙重性會降低公司績效的觀點。

Over past decade, lots of researchers discussed and researched the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. However, there is no consensus for the conclusion derived from theory and empirical researches. Moreover, most of empirical researches pointed out CEO duality had no significant effect on firm performance, and this result conflicted with our general cognition. In generally speaking, people would consider CEO duality as a negative effect on the firm performance. After reviewing some related theories, it seemed that information cost could impact the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance, so this study expect information cost could eliminate the gap of conclusion between prior researches and general cognition. This study used Taiwan general listed company as subject, period from 2000 to 2012, and data downloaded from the database of Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ). To estimate and analyze the panel data, random-effects model has been adopted in this study. According to the empirical results in this research, it shows CEO duality has no significant effect on firm performance, same as most of prior work; CEO duality has negative effect on firm performance when considering information cost of firm. The result tends to accept the viewpoint of agency theory that CEO duality could decline firm performance.