标题: | 专利授权之诉讼策略实证分析-以半导体产业为中心 Empirical Study on the Litigation Strategy for Semiconductor Patent Licensing |
作者: | 许淑雅 Hsu, Shu-Ya 刘尚志 Liu, Shang-Jyh 管理学院科技法律学程 |
关键字: | 专利诉讼;专利授权;权利金;实证研究;Patent litigation;patent license;royalty;empirical study |
公开日期: | 2015 |
摘要: | 传统上台湾公司建构专利组合最主要的目的是为了防御,即有效降低专利权利金的支付。然而随着对于无形智慧财产权的运用方式与学习,愈来愈多公司了解到它的价值可能高于透过制造产品所产生的利润,于是很多公司纷纷检视自家的专利是否有授权的可能性,积极运用智慧财产权为公司创造盈余。随着台湾研发能力的提升,对智财权运用趋势发展之了解,台湾公司保守的作法若能改变策略反守为攻,不仅能有效降低权利金的支出,更有机会能为企业增加收益。 然而要如何做才能活用智财权并达到增加收益的目的呢? 本文希望以专利诉讼及授权谈判实务经验中所观察到的现象为基础,利用客观的授权资料及诉讼成本分析,提供专利授权者在考虑发动专利诉讼以达到授权目的时应该检视的诉讼策略,供作业界参考。本文藉由实证研究,分析专利诉讼中可能影响经济效益的因素,发现如果被告过去六年之营业额持平未大幅成长,原告被告双方对于和解的想法比较容易趋于一致,而于短时间和解节省诉讼费用。如果被告过去六年的营业额大幅成长,那么原告被告双方对于和解的想法会有比较大的落差,因此延迟和解时间而耗费较多诉讼费用。如果专利有明显被判决无效的可能性,则被告宁可诉讼到底支付律师费也不会轻言和解支付赔偿金给原告,因此会拖延和解的时间。若将重要客户一起列为共同被告,会促使被告尽快和解。若被告提起反诉或确认之诉将会增加原告的诉讼成本,降低可能的赔偿金,而严重影响原告的诉讼经济效益。 因此建议原告于提起诉讼前应先做好策略规划及风险评估,对于专利强度,主要被告及共同被告,诉讼法院,事务所选择,成本控制,和解条件等都应做适当的规划,并试算控诉该被告是否符合经济效益。 Taiwanese companies used to consider the value of a patent portfolio as a defense line against royalty-seeking licensors for reducing the royalty payout. Recently, some companies have realized that patent licensing may be a more profitable and efficient way to monetize the fruit of R&D, i.e. the intellectual properties, than actually manufacturing products. People now are reviewing every piece of intellectual property carefully and aggressively, evaluating every opportunity that may bring in cash. If Taiwanese companies are able to switch their mindset about the application of intellectual property to a more active position through following and understanding the latest development of intellectual property monetization, they may be able to get more profits out of their intellectual property. This research is trying to figure out ways to achieve the goal by analyzing published information about licensing data and litigation expenses in real cases. The goal is to provide a guideline for patentees to trim the litigation strategy regarding suits for licensing. By applying empirical research, several economic factors are analyzed. This research finds that in cases the revenue of a defendant has not rapidly increased and remained stable during the 6-year period prior to the litigation, settlement usually can be reached faster in order to reduce litigation cost, and vice versa. If the asserted patent has high likelihood to be invalid in the final judgment, then the defendant prefers to defend seriously rather than pay licensing fee easily, therefor delay the settlement. Listing defendant’s major customers as co-defendants is found useful for shortening the time to settlement. A counter suit or declaration judgment action raised by defendant will increase the litigation cost, reduce the possible compensation, and severely impact the litigation economics. Therefore, as a patentee, one should well set up the litigation strategy and evaluate the risk of counter action in advance before filing a lawsuit. The considered maters include patent strength, major and co-defendants, litigation court, law firm selection, cost control, settlement condition. It is even better to estimate the economic effect for filing this lawsuit against the identified defendants. |
URI: | http://140.113.39.130/cdrfb3/record/nctu/#GT079868520 http://hdl.handle.net/11536/127144 |
显示于类别: | Thesis |