管理者持股對公司違約風險之影響：風險敏感度觀點

Abstract

楊東曉、蘇秋竹 (民101) 發現管理者持股可誘使管理者致力於提高企業價值，可降低公司未來違約風險，但本研究發現管理者持股亦會同時產生藉由提高企業風險來提高持股價值之誘因 (簡稱為企業風險誘因)，而此企業風險誘因會提高公司未來違約風險，故管理者持股對公司違約風險之影響，同時存在正向與負向的影響。另外，本研究進一步發現管理者的保守程度可減緩其手中持股產生的企業風險誘因。本研究結果可作為董事會或薪酬委員會於制訂管理者獎酬之參考，倘若管理者本身具有風險偏好特性，此時若再給予管理者額外的權益獎酬，可能會提高企業違約風險，造成企業價值之損失。

Yang and Su (2012) document that the managerial shareholdings provide incentive for CEO to decrease the default risk of a firm. However, we find that managerial shareholdings also have another incentive, risk-seeking incentive, which would increase firm default risk. The risk-seeking incentive is defined as the incentive for CEO to increase the value of shareholdings by increasing the risk of a firm. Consequently, managerial shareholdings not only produce a positive effect on the default risk of a firm but also have a negative effect on firm default risk. Moreover, the results of our tests show that the degree of conservativeness of CEO could alleviate the risk-seeking incentive rooted in managerial shareholdings. Our research provides an implication for director board or compensation committee when determining the compensation for CEO. The grant of equity-based compensation to the CEOs who prefer risk would jeopardize firm value, because the risk-seeking incentive encourages the CEOs to take risky activities to increase their wealth.