捷運建設計畫納入租稅增額融資之審議機制與財務風險分析

Abstract

根據「跨域加值公共建設財務規劃方案」以及「大眾捷運系統建設及周邊土地開發計畫申請與審查作業要點」，針對我國捷運建設計畫，中央政府規範自償率之計算需納入租稅增額融資等相關收益，並以自償率為財務審查之門檻，並訂定相對應的捷運建設補貼等獎勵措施，要求地方政府將捷運建設外部效益內部化，並提高建設自償率。然而租稅增額融資機制乃為預期性的風險財政融資工具，若稅收增額的成長趨勢未如預期，將導致政府財政負擔加劇之風險。

因此，本研究在我國現行捷運建設計畫之審議機制架構下，從地方政府觀點出發，以多目標規劃數學模式闡述於相關法律、財務限制式下，並考量兼顧稅收增額融資風險最小化，以及最大化中央政府給予之建設補貼經費，在此二者目標權衡下，地方政府最佳的財務妥協解，並以蒙地卡羅法模擬租稅增額融資之機率分配，量化租稅增額可能之損失風險。

According to ”Project for Cross-Field Value-Adding in Public Works Financial Planning” and "Guidelines for Application and Review of Plans for Mass Rapid Transit System Construction Projects & Development of Adjacent Land", the central government of Taiwan regulates that tax-increment revenue must be included in the calculation of the SLR(Self-Liquidation Ratio) among all MRT construction projects. And with the mechanism about the SLR threshold and some subsidy for the MRT construction project as an incentive, the central government hopes that the local governments can not only internalize external benefit but raise the self-financing ability of MRT project. However, tax increment financing is a risky financing method, which may result in the increase of financial risk to authorities concerned, if the growth of tax increment is far below the expected.

Therefore, under the mechanism of MRT projects and some legal and financial restrictions in Taiwan, this research develops the model by the multi-objective programming from the point of local governments, considering the goals of both minimizing the risk of tax increment financing and maximizing the subsidy of MRT projects. The model illustrates the trade-off for these two goals and gives the financial best-compromised solution. Furthermore, the research also quantifies the possible loss of tax increment and its probability distribution by Monte-Carlo simulation.