例外狀態之戰：施密特與阿岡本的法哲學對話

Abstract

這本論文所探討的是兩位當代重要思想家的法哲學對話，一位是二十世紀的德國法律─政治哲學家卡爾‧施密特（Carl Schmitt），另一位則是目前仍持續寫作的義大利基進思想家喬治‧阿岡本（Giorgio Agamben）。主標題「例外狀態之戰」意味著這場對話具有論戰性，也就是例外狀態的概念一方面乃是施密特建構其主權決斷論的思想利器，另一方面也是阿岡本用以解構其主權概念，同時拒絕回歸法治國之規範論的另類法律思想基礎。本文首先探討施密特與阿岡本如何理解與面對主權與例外狀態概念的弔詭特質：例外狀態作為法律可以被合法懸置的狀態，而主權乃是可以不受法律拘束的至高法權。這正是因為，主權即為決定例外狀態的權力。這個弔詭一方面構成了施密特之法學決斷論的基礎，另一方面也成為阿岡本之例外狀態理論的出發點。 因此接下來本文將分為兩部分：第一部分將深入探討施密特決斷論思想中的三種「法決定」概念：司法性的判決、行政性的獨裁，以及立法性的制憲權。而我將在這三者的關係基礎上重新詮釋那作為其綜合的最終法決定：主權決斷。本文的第二部分則將探討阿岡本對於例外狀態概念的基進轉化，使其得以用來解構施密特的主權理論。這個解構主要包含兩個進路：一為對於主權與例外狀態之概念連結的拆解，另一則是對於主權與主權者之連結的解消。第一條路徑包含了對於古羅馬的「懸法」（iustitium）制度與班雅明的「真實例外狀態」概念的探討；第二條路徑則包括對於古羅馬的權威（auctoritas）概念、主權者的喪禮儀式，以及班雅明所論之巴洛克哀悼劇中的主權者形象進行解析。在這雙重解構之後，阿岡本進一步嘗試在班雅明「純粹暴力」的概念基礎上提出相對於主權與制憲權的解構概念：解制的潛能。最後，我將探討阿岡本彌賽亞思想中的法律哲學，思考彌賽亞所帶來之法的「完成」的意涵，以及何謂彌賽亞的「新法」。我將嘗試指出，這個法的完成所意味的乃是法律效力的解消，而由此所產生的則是對於法之「精神」的回歸，以及一種與人的「生命形式」完全重疊的新的法概念。

This dissertation is an investigation into the theoretical relationship between two influential legal-political philosophers of our time: Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben. The title indicates that the concept of exception is the stake of their combating thoughts on the problem of law. For Schmitt, the real possibility of state of exception makes the sovereign decision on it indispensable, while for Agamben it is precisely a “real” state of exception that makes the deactivate of sovereignty possible. Based on this critical opposition of their viewpoints, the first part of the thesis identifies and analyzes three types of legal decision in Schmitt’s decisionism: the judgement of the court, the dictatorship of the government, and the constituent power of the people. It would then demonstrates how the concept of sovereignty finally integrates all these legal decisions and becomes the founding concept of Schmitt’s legal decisionism. The second part of the dissertation investigates the radical transformation of the concept of state of exception by Agamben. First of all, he tries to cut the conceptual link between state of exception and dictatorship by bringing forth the Roman archetype of the state of exception, iustitium, which shows that the suspension of law does not entail the concentration of power. Secondly, he tries to unbind sovereignty and the sovereign’s very life by illustrating how this supreme power has been fictitiously founded on the very person of its bearer through the auctoritas of the Roman senate and the public mourning of the emperors. Thirdly, he reconstructs a theoretical combat between Schmitt and Benjamin to highlight the potential of those concepts Benjamin developed to counter Schmitt, such as pure violence and real state of exception. Finally, the polemics concludes with an interpretation of Agamben’s messianic thought on law. It suggests that, through the messianic suspension of law, one might be able to reconceive the “spirit” of law, and the realization of this spirit coincides at every point with one’s own form-of-life as a “new” law.